America\u27s Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions by Dreier, Peter
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 71 | Number 5 Article 3
6-1-1993
America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes,
Solutions
Peter Dreier
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 1351 (1993).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol71/iss5/3
AMERICA'S URBAN CRISIS: SYMPTOMS,
CAUSES, SOLUTIONS
PETER DREIER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the biggest challenge facing America today is the crisis in
its cities. The obstacles to success are to some extent economic, given the
federal budget deficit. The end of the Cold War, however, offers an un-
precedented opportunity to reorder national priorities and address long-
unmet domestic needs.
In reality, the obstacles are primarily political and ideological. Fed-
eral priorities are shaped by power politics, and cities have become in-
creasingly isolated in national politics. The nation's changing
demographics, particularly the growth of the suburbs, also play an im-
portant part in shaping national priorities. Today, fewer members of
Congress represent only cities. A growing number of districts incorpo-
rate cities and nearby suburbs; some have become entirely suburban.
Even those members of Congress who represent only cities now have
weaker ties to organized voters; with the rise of national political action
committees, congressional loyalties have shifted from urban political ma-
chines to national corporate campaign contributors. While the nation's
major corporations have no single political agenda, powerful sectors
within the business community influence government decisions regarding
tax, spending, and regulatory policies in ways that undermine healthy
cities.
In addition, many Americans believe that even if there were ample
money, we would not know what to do with it, or at least could not
guarantee that it would be spent wisely or efficiently to solve the nation's
urban problems. Many pundits argue, and many Americans believe, that
America has tried to save its cities, but that the cities resist being saved.
Twenty-five years after the Kerner Commission Report, the condition of
America's cities is in many ways worse than ever. From this reality,
reinforced by an enormous corporate-sponsored ideological assault on
* E.P. Clapp Distinguished Professor of Politics, Occidental College in Los Angeles.
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government activism (particularly during the 1970s and 1980s), 1 many
Americans have concluded that problems such as poverty and crime may
be intractable. At the very least, there is considerable public skepticism
about the capacity of the federal government to solve the cities' social
and economic problems.
In general, public opinion is more supportive of local government
than of Washington. In fact, during the past decade, many local govern-
ments have developed innovative ways to deliver basic services, improve
management. They also have created partnerships with community-
based organizations, increased citizen participation in decision-making,
and expanded the legal and regulatory tools for addressing issues such as
housing, crime, and economic development. Many of the successful ef-
forts to "reinvent" government have occurred at the local level.2 Efforts
of this type are reported regularly in journals such as Governing, but they
rarely find their way into the mainstream media.
The fact remains, however, that cities lack the resources to address
the problems they confront. Until the nation's political climate is more
hospitable to addressing these problems, cities will face continued isola-
tion in national politics. That transformation won't be easy. Cities re-
main under attack as symbols of the failure of activist government and
well-intentioned, but naive, liberalism. The conservative attack on cities
is merely a part of a larger privatization agenda to reduce government
and discredit public endeavors of economic uplift. Politically, cities suf-
fer from voter backlashes against crime, drugs, illegitimacy, youth vio-
lence, minorities, the "undeserving" poor, and government itself. To the
critics and cynics, programs such as public housing, Model Cities, Urban
Development Action Grants (UDAGs), and welfare represent well-inten-
tioned government gone awry. To an increasingly skeptical public, giv-
ing cities more money means handing tax dollars to politically-connected
developers (symbolized by the recent HUD scandal), big-city mayors
who dole out patronage jobs to loyal constituents or incompetent bureau-
crats, poor people who engage in destructive anti-social behavior, or
well-meaning do-gooders who run social programs that seem neither to
lift the poor out of poverty nor to teach them middle-class values. But
there are increasing indications-including the Clinton-Gore victory in
November 1992-that the public mood is shifting. This Essay assumes
that the political will can be mobilized to address the nation's urban cri-
1. KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR 59-66 (1990); Peter Dreier, Cap.
italists vs the Media: An Analysis of an Ideological Mobilization Among Business Leaders, 4
MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC'Y 111, 111-32 (1982); Herbert Gans, Deconstructing the Underclass,
56 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N, Summer 1990, at 271, 271-77.
2. DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT (1992).
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sis. First, it examines the growing isolation of cities in national politics.
It then reviews the symptoms and root causes of the urban crisis. Fi-
nally, it proposes a policy agenda for addressing these problems and con-
fronting the political dilemmas.
II. THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
In April 1992, while the largest civil disorder in American history
was erupting in Los Angeles, staffers at The Atlantic magazine were edit-
ing an article by political analyst William Schneider entitled The Dawn of
the Suburban Era in American Politics.' The confluence of these two
events reflects the dilemma of America's urban crisis; in ways not dis-
cussed in Schneider's article, however, it also suggests solutions.
At a meeting the previous August, the nation's mayors discussed the
idea for a "save our cities" march in Washington to be held in the midst
of the presidential election. The mayors got a variety of unions, public
interest groups, church organizations, and other groups to agree to co-
sponsor the march, which they set for May 6. Only a few weeks before
the scheduled event, the march was attracting little interest from presi-
dential candidates or the media. But the L.A. riots erupted a week
before the scheduled march, which guaranteed a significant turnout-
over 150,000 people-and reasonable media coverage.4
Indeed, for a few weeks following the Los Angeles riots, America's
urban crisis was a hot topic. It was the subject of congressional debate,
discussed on television talk shows, and featured in newsmagazine cover
stories. Sociologists and other urban experts expounded their theories
about underlying causes and remedies. In the midst of a heated race for
the White House, President Bush and his Democratic rivals visited Los
Angeles and other cities to demonstrate their concern. Once the journal-
ists left Los Angeles, however, Congress passed a meager quick-fix emer-
gency urban aid package,5 the candidates for President turned their
attention to other issues, and the plight of America's cities returned to
political obscurity.
3. William Schneider, The Suburban Century Begins, ATLANTIC, July 1992, at 33-44.
Perhaps to link Schneider's essay to the then-current national election, the title on the maga-
zine's cover was The Dawn of the Suburban Era in American Politics.
4. See, e.g., Barbara Vobejda, Mayors' Pleas Take On a New-Found Urgency, WASH.
POST, May 16, 1992, at 1A.
5. After a month of political posturing and bargaining, the White House and Congress
agreed on a $1.3 billion package, including a $500 million summer jobs program for youth and
loans and grants to rebuild homes and businesses destroyed in the Los Angeles riots and the
April flood in downtown Chicago. See Clifford Krauss, Bush and Congress Reach an Accord
on Aid for Cities, N.Y. TIMEs, June 18, 1992, at Al, B12.
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In his Atlantic cover story, timed to coincide with the two parties'
nominating conventions, Schneider noted that the 1992 election would be
the first in which suburbanites represented a majority of voters, echoing
the view expressed in Thomas and Mary Edsall's popular book, Chain
Reaction,6 published a year earlier. In their book, the Edsalls argue that
"[s]uburbanization has permitted whites to satisfy liberal ideals revolving
around activist government, while keeping to a minimum the number of
blacks and the poor who share in government largess."7 They concluded
that "the nation is moving steadily toward a national politics that will be
dominated by the suburban vote" and that "a politics of suburban he-
gemony will come to characterize presidential elections." 8 Schneider
also argued that changing demographics are moving American politics
away from cities. We have begun a "suburban century" in American
politics, Schneider wrote, in which candidates for national office, and for
a majority of congressional seats, can ignore urban America without pay-
ing a political price.9
Schneider noted that in 1960 the nation was divided about equally
between urban, rural, and suburban residents. By 1990, the urban popu-
lation had declined to 31.3%, the rural population had fallen to 22.5%,
and the suburban population had grown to 46.2%, nearly half of the
nation. Given suburbanites' higher rate of voter participation, they now
account for a majority of voters.
The Edsalls' book and Schneider's essay helped frame media cover-
age of the 1992 elections, including the presidential campaign. 0 Report-
ers and columnists spilled a lot of ink describing the race for the White
House as a contest for the "swing" suburban vote, especially the disaf-
fected working-class and middle-class "Reagan Democrats." Suburban-
6. THOMAS B. EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF
RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1991).
7. Id. at 228.
8. Id. at 229, 231.
9. Schneider, supra note 2, at 33-44. Schneider had outlined his argument almost a year
earlier in Rule Suburbia, 23 NAT'L J. 2335, 2335 (Sept. 28, 1991). Even earlier, a USA Today
reporter interviewed Schneider about the bankruptcy of Bridgeport, Connecticut. Anticipat-
ing what he would write a few months later, Schneider said: "It signifies the abandonment of
the American city and the suburbanization of American politics.... Bridgeport could be the
beginning of a problem that's going to spread all over the country." Bruce Frankel, Connecti-
cut City's Bankruptcy May Be "'Dangerous" Precedent, USA TODAY, July 16, 1991, at 3A.
A Bush Administration official appeared to confirm Schneider's view when, soon after the
Los Angeles riots, he told the Boston Globe that urban poverty and unemployment among
black youth are "not our issue, not our constituency." Michael Kranish & Peter G. Gosselin,
Aides Split Over Bush Urban Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, May 17, 1992, at 1, 19.
10. See Fred Barnes, Up Against the Mall, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 21, 1991, at 43; Robert
Reinhold, Chasing Votes from Big Cities to the Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1992, at Al.
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ites even seemed to have an impact on the candidates' strategies.
Unfortunately, Schneider's view reflects what has become the conven-
tional wisdom among a growing number of political analysts, journalists,
office holders, and social scientists-and what threatens to become a self-
fulfilling prophecy.
On September 1, 1991, following an interview with three big-city
mayors on NBC's "Meet the Press," panelist David Broder, the influen-
tial Washington Post political columnist, said:
I think it's very unlikely [that urban affairs will be a central
issue in the Presidential campaign]. There is nobody who is
really city-based who is in the race at this point. And I think
the focus will be on who can swing the suburban vote. Politi-
cally, that's where the numbers are now."
Bob Herbert of the New York Daily News, another panelist, agreed,
observing:
Not only are the cities in trouble, the cities are in trouble for a
long time to come. I think the fact that the urban agenda is not
going to be a big campaign issue in '92 by either party is proof
that the cities have been abandoned. Neither party sees any
value in making that part of their campaign. 12
The truth, however, is that during the entire postwar period, cities
have only had a major voice in national politics either when business
leaders wanted to improve the commercial climate of downtowns or
when disenfranchised people disrupted business as usual with protests or
riots. When urban mayors and political machines helped deliver the vote
for Presidents and congressional candidates, they had greater access than
they do now. But the proof of urban clout is in the way federal policies
help or hurt cities, and, as described below, most federal policies during
the entire postwar era-housing, transportation, defense, and others-
have promoted the suburbanization of residents and businesses. For
many years, political observers had opined that Americans fled to the
suburbs to escape urban problems. In reality, their move to the suburbs
was subsidized by a host of federal policies. Federal aid to cities-
whether to revitalize downtowns or to help low-income neighborhoods-
has served, in effect, to "clean up" the problems created by federally as-
sisted disinvestment.
These demographic changes have significant political repercussions,
as the Edsalls and Schneider point out,13 but they should not be viewed
11. Meet the Press, (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 1, 1991).
12. Id.
13. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 6, at 228.
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as a major sea-change in national politics, but as part of an ongoing
trend. What is relatively novel, however, is the view that not only are
cities politically weak, but that they are also economically obsolete.
The bankruptcy or near-bankruptcy of several major cities led to a
spate of recent stories about the fiscal problems of America's cities and
about the political implications of the widening gap between cities and
suburbs. USA Today quoted the ubiquitous Schneider, who claimed that
Americang no longer believe in the "myth" that cities are the engines of
industry or centers of culture and that "they don't want to pay for them
anymore."14
A week later, Newsweek ran a story entitled Are Cities Obsolete?,
arguing that with the decline of manufacturing and the suburbanization
of people and jobs, cities no longer have a central function in American
society. The newsmagazine's thesis was summarized by Daniel
Mandelker, a Washington University law professor: "We don't need [cit-
ies] anymore."15 In the New Republic, columnist Fred Barnes wrote that
the idea of the federal government's aiding the cities is "no longer viable"
because
suburban politicians make entire careers out of protecting their
constituents from the spillover of urban social disorder. And
there's another reason, familiar to any suburban parent, for the
lack of concern for cities. Suburban kids scarcely go into the
city anymore. Mine don't, anyway. When I was growing up in
the suburbs (Arlington, Virginia) going into the city was a
treat. My kids, third-generation suburbanites, regard it as an
ordeal, they respond to the centrifugal pull of malls.16
Around the same time, Washington Post reporter Joel Garreau ar-
gued in a book entitled Edge City: Life on the New Frontier, that the
growth of suburban office/retail/residential complexes, such as Tyson's
Corner, Virginia-usually at the intersection of interstate highways-
represents the wave of the future, rendering cities and central business
districts increasingly obsolete. Rather than view this development as a
product of federal policy decisions, Garreau viewed it primarily as the
result of developers responding to consumer demand. Garreau's widely
quoted book helped confirm the pessimistic analysis of America's cities. 17
Edge City paralleled a more academic work by economist Thomas Stan-
14. Frankel, supra note 9, at 3A.
15. Are Cities Obsolete?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 9, 1991, at 42.
16. Barnes, supra note 10, at 43.
17. For critical reviews of Edge City, see Jane Holtz Kay, No Place Like Home, 253 THE
NATION 454 (Oct. 14, 1991), and Robert Wood, The Developer as Folk Hero, BosTON GLOBE,
Sept. 1, 1991, at A12.
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back, published the same year, The New Suburbanization: Challenge to
the Central City, which identified the changing industrial and occupa-
tional composition of central cities and suburbs during the 1970s and
1980s.18
Following closely on the heels of Edge City, the New York Times
sponsored a survey to analyze the changing role of New York City in the
metropolitan area. Two headlines reflect its findings: "Region Around
New York Sees Ties to City Faltering"; "For Many in the New York
Region, The City is Ignored and Irrelevant." 19
For years, mayors and other urban advocates had warned that cities
were ticking time bombs, waiting to explode. When the Los Angeles ri-
ots erupted, many hoped that it would catalyze a major national commit-
ment to revitalize the cities-an urban Marshall Plan. Unfortunately,
such pleas fell on deaf ears. Although the 1992 Democratic and Republi-
can conventions took place shortly after the L.A. riots, and took place in
two troubled cities-New York and Houston, respectively-the problem
of urban decay was conspicuously absent from the speeches and the party
platforms-as well as from the subsequent campaigns. This fact was not
lost on the nation's urban leaders.
As a result of economic and demographic changes, as well as of me-
dia coverage of urban affairs emphasizing the negative aspects of city life,
cities have experienced a growing political isolation during the past dec-
ade.20 The strong political coalitions of the New Deal and the Great
Society, including the labor movement and big-city mayors, have been
shattered. Groups such as the United States Conference of Mayors
(USCM) and the National League of Cities wield less clout in Washing-
ton lobbying circles today than in the past. The most recent effort to
build an urban-centered electoral coalition, the National Rainbow Coali-
tion, was marginalized after the Democrats' 1988 presidential defeat.
"We're tired of coming to Washington with a tin cup in our hands,"
said Boston Mayor Ray Flynn when he assumed the presidency of the
USCM in 1991. The dramatic decline in federal aid to cities during the
Reagan-Bush years forced mayors and their urban allies to rethink how
18. THOMAS M. STANBACK, JR., THE NEW SUBURBANIZATION: CHALLENGE TO THE
CENTRAL CITY 1-120 (1991).
19. William Glaberson, For Many in the New York Region, The City is Ignored and Irrele-
vant, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1992, at Al; Elizabeth Kolbert, Region Around New York Sees Ties
to City Faltering, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1991, at Al.
20. See Jonathan Walters, Cities on Their Own, GOVERNING, Apr. 1991, at 27, 27-32.
For a discussion of media coverage of the Los Angeles riots, see Edwin Diamond, It's Deja Vu
All Over Again, NEW YORK, June 1, 1992, at 40-43. For a discussion of media coverage of
housing problems, see Peter Dreier & Alex Dubro, Housing: The Invisible Crisis, WASH.
JOURNALISM REV., May 1991, at 20-24.
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to put cities back on the nation's agenda. They recognize that moral
appeals to social justice and human suffering are difficult to sustain, par-
ticularly during periods of economic distress among the middle class. A
New York Times/CBS national poll conducted the week following the
L.A. riots found that 60% of Americans believed the nation was spend-
ing "too little" on cities-up from 46% in 1988.21 Urban advocates real-
ize, however, that this sentiment is unlikely to prevail--or translate into
policy prescriptions-unless suburbanites believe that they, too, have a
stake in revitalizing our cities, beyond short-term "riot insurance." This
rethinking has led mayors and urban advocates to emphasize increas-
ingly both the continuing economic importance of cities to metropolitan
regions and to the nation in an effort to find common ground between
cities and the rest of America.22 This theme was summarized by Boston
Mayor Ray Flynn in his 1991 inaugural speech as President of the
USCM: "As cities go, so goes America."
For example, in November 1990, in preparation for the 1992 presi-
dential elections, the mayors of the nation's largest cities held an Urban
Summit in New York City to begin framing a new way to discuss cities.23
Usually such meetings turn into a catalog of fiscal, economic, and social
problems. At this meeting, however, the mayors agreed that it was im-
portant to emphasize the value of cities as well as their problems. When
the mayors issued their statement, they titled it In the National Interest.24
To make their case, the mayors released the results of a national
survey, conducted in October 1990, which sought to ascertain how city
dwellers and suburbanites perceive cities-specifically the ones in which,
or near which, they live-by interviewing respondents who live in or
around the nation's 100 largest cities. The survey found that people liv-
ing further from cities (broken down by those who live within twenty
miles and those who live within twenty-one to sixty miles) have a positive
attitude toward their central city. A vast majority of suburbanites are
willing to pay higher taxes to provide programs such as housing for the
poor (74%), AIDS treatment (72%), AIDS prevention (71%), and pub-
lic schools (66%). In fact, of the thirteen programs identified in the sur-
21. Robin Toner, Los Angeles Riots Are a Warning, Americans Fear, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
1992, at Al.
22. See, eg., Rob Gurwitt, The Painful Truth About Cities and Suburbs: They Need Each
Other, GOVERNING, Feb. 1992, at 56, 56-60; Mark K. Joseph, Baltimore Makes the Suburbs
Richer, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 13, 1991, at 3M; David Rusk, America's Urban Apartheid, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21, 1992, at A29. Rusk is the former mayor of Albuquerque, New Mexico.
23. See Alan Ehrenhalt, The Mayors Need to Agree on a Message: Innovation or Despera-
tion, GOVERNING, Sept. 1991, at 11.
24. IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST: THE 1990 URBAN SUMMIT (Ronald Berkman et al.
eds., 1992) [hereinafter IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST].
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vey, only two-middle-income housing (47%) and mass transit (40%)-
received less than majority support. The survey also asked out-of-city
residents how they use the city. Among those who Jive within twenty
miles of the nearest big city, 46% of the households have at least one
member who works in the city, 67% depend upon that city for major
medical services, and 43% have household members who attend, or will
soon attend, an institution of higher education based in the city.25
To strengthen their argument, American's urban leaders (including
the National League of Cities and the U.S. Conference of Mayors) spon-
sored several academic studies to examine the economic ties between cit-
ies and suburbs, and between cities and the national economy. One
study, looking at population and economic trends in metropolitan areas,
found that declining cities lead to declining suburbs, while growing cities
correlated with growing suburbs.26 Another study demonstrated that
those metropolitan regions with the widest disparities between city and
suburbs achieved the lowest rates of economic growth and prosperity.27
This finding corroborates the belief of 46% of suburban homeowners (in
the Goldberg survey) that a long-term economic decline in the city would
reduce the market value of their property.
The USCM report, Does America Need Cities?, sponsored in collab-
oration with the Economic Policy Institute, directly confronted the anal-
ysis of cities as economically obsolete.28 It labelled as tragically wrong
the notion that a majority of Americans can live in suburban and rural
prosperity while the center of our metropolitan areas decay. Now that
the United States no longer dominates the global economy and is cur-
rently engaged in fierce global competition, the nation as a whole cannot
afford the burden of large numbers of unemployed and underemployed
people in the inner cities. Further, the report argued, because urban de-
cay spreads from inner cities to inner ring suburbs to outlying areas, in-
vestment in cities will yield the greatest return for improving the nation's
economy.
Although this "common ground" approach is partially rooted in the
cities' political weakness and their resulting need to adopt an "if-you-
can't-beat-'em-join-em" strategy, it also arises from the very real ties be-
25. Arthur S. Goldberg, Americans and Their Cities: Solicitude and Support, in IN THE
NATIONAL INTEREST, supra note 24, at 37, 37-45.
26. Hank Savitch et al., Ties That Bind: Central Cities, Suburbs and the New Metropolitan
Region, 7 ECON. DEv. Q., No. 4, (forthcoming Nov. 1993).
27. LARRY C. LEDEBUR & WILLIAM R. BARNES, CITY DISTRESS, METROPOLITAN DIS-
PARITIES, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1992).
28. JOSEPH PERSKY ET AL., DOES AMERICA NEED CrrIES?-AN URBAN INVESTMENT
STRATEGY FOR NATIONAL PROSPERITY (1991). For the sake of full disclosure, the reader
should know that the author was involved in designing this report.
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tween changing cities and changing suburbs. Not all suburbs resemble
the affluent communities depicted in most TV sitcoms from the 1950s
and 1960s, such as "Leave It To Beaver" and "Father Knows Best," or
more recent shows, such as "Thirtysomething." Many blue-collar inner-
ring suburbs, and even many white-collar suburbs, face social, fiscal, and
economic troubles similar to those facing the cities. There is still no em-
pirical research, however, that adequately differentiates suburbs based on
these economic and demographic characteristics-a task that would en-
hance the capacity of urban leaders to build coalitions.
In this regard, the U.S. Census definitions are not helpful. The Ed-
sails and Schneider relied on the census to make their claims about the
suburbs' growing electoral strength, as well as about the widening eco-
nomic and political gap between cities and suburbs. But what some de-
mographers and political analysts call suburbs are actually small and
medium-size cities that share many of the characteristics of nearby cen-
tral cities. In the Boston area, for example, the Census Bureau classifies
both Somerville and Chelsea as suburbs, but these troubled industrial
communities share the same poverty, fiscal troubles, and social problems
as Boston. Many metropolitan areas have communities like these.29
Similarly, the newer, growing communities outside cities share
many features and problems with larger, older cities. Although fewer
suburbanites now commute to the central cities, their fates are still inter-
twined. Many bedroom suburbs may seek to quarantine themselves from
the economic and social problems created by a troubled economy-
widening income disparities, rising poverty, and the environmental and
related problems created by sprawl-but they cannot do so successfully
without reverting to a fortress-like siege mentality that undermines the
quality of life.
At the metropolitan level, political fragmentation, racism, and other
obstacles have made it difficult for cities and suburbs to craft common
solutions. Only a few cities are in a position to annex outlying areas.
Efforts to forge metropolitan-wide government, with a few exceptions
(such as Jacksonville and Indianapolis), have met with strong resistance,
particularly by suburbanites. Special purpose districts or authorities-
governing parks or transportation, for example-have made the most
headway, but they deal with very specific issues.30
29. See, e.g., Peggy McCarthy, Cities on the Brink, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 5, 1992, at 36
(discussing the bankruptcy of West Haven, Connecticut); Nicholas Lemann, Naperville.
Stressed Out in Suburbia, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 1989, at 34-38; John McCormick & Peter
McKillop, The Other Suburbia, NEWSWEEK, June 26, 1989, at 22-24.
30. Richard C. Hartman, Academics Look at Regional Governance (summary of discus-
sion at above-mentioned seminar; on file with author); Arnold Howitt, Metropolitan Govern-
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In this context, cities will have to build political (rather than govern-
ance) coalitions with suburbs, particularly at the federal level, based on
their common destinies. From this perspective, no serious effort to revi-
talize America's struggling economy can succeed without paying atten-
tion to the cities. The urban crisis, although its symptoms are
particularly concentrated in our cities, is really a national problem. The
problems facing cities and their residents are a major drain on our na-
tion's productivity. Most of the nation's underproductive workforce and
infrastructure is located in cities. Unless they can become part of the
solution rather than the problem, they will continue to handicap
America's efforts to compete successfully in a fast-changing global
economy.
Whether this reality is translated into public policy remains to be
seen. During the 1992 presidential campaign the candidates' basic strat-
egy was to focus on the suburban vote. Having captured the Democratic
nomination by June, Clinton attended the USCM's June conference and
agreed to adopt some of the group's recommendations, including a public
works initiative that linked improving cities with national economic
growth."1 Although Clinton campaigned in many inner city neighbor-
hoods, and although the Democrats launched a small-scale voter regis-
tration drive in inner cities, the Clinton campaign continued to define the
key battleground as the suburbs.
Nonetheless, there were signs that the "common ground" message
was taking root. Twice in May, with the L.A. riot embers still smolder-
ing, Bill Clinton campaigned in the Republican California suburbs of Or-
ange and San Diego counties, linking the problems of suburbanites with
those of the inner cities.3" Post-election analysts concurred that while
Clinton won a majority of the urban vote (in a three-way race that in-
cluded independent candidate Ross Perot, a Texas businessman who cap-
tured 19% of the popular vote), including large margins in low-income
and minority neighborhoods, the key to Clinton's victory was his success
ance in the 1990s (background memo prepared for a seminar on metropolitan governance,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, July 1991; on file with author);
see also Sarah Bartlett, Cooperation Treaty is Signed to Bolster Regional Economy, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 1991, at Al (describing an agreement between New York, Connecticut, and New
Jersey); see also Katherine Barrett & Richard Greene, The Nutmeg Doughnut: Why America's
Richest State Has Three of the Country's Poorest Cities, FIN. WORLD, Feb. 18, 1992, at 50-51
(explaining that Connecticut's tax structure has led to a polarization of the classes).
31. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Mayors Applaud Clinton's Promise to Remake American
Economy, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1992, at A19.
32. Chris Black, Clinton Links Suburbanites to Solutions for Urban lls, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 10, 1992, at 9; David Lauter, Clinton Tells Orange County Not to Ignore Cities, L.A.
TIMES, May 31, 1992, at Al.
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in capturing (or making gains over earlier Democratic candidates) the
suburban vote, particularly in the inner-ring suburbs.33
During his first few months in office, Clinton proposed an economic
recovery package that included a significant increase in federal assistance
to cities, appointed a strong urban advocate (former San Antonio Mayor
Henry Cisneros) to head HUD, and met several times with the nation's
leading mayors to discuss their problems and agenda. But the nation's
urban crisis is still far from the top of the country's agenda. Until we
engage in a serious rethinking of how to discuss the role of America's
cities in our political and economic life, the problems of urban America
will continue to gnaw at our social fabric.
III. SYMPTOMS
No other major industrial nation has allowed its cities to face the
type of fiscal and social troubles-such as the concentration of poverty-
confronting America's cities. Other nations do not permit the level of
sheer destitution and decay found in America's cities. We see the conse-
quences of inattention every day: growing poverty, homelessness, violent
crime, and infant mortality; widening racial and economic segregation;
crumbling infrastructure; and deepening fiscal traumas.
A. Poverty and Declining Living Standards
During the 1980s, the rich got richer, the middle class saw their
living standards decline, and more Americans suffered in poverty. The
dramatic increase in poverty was concentrated in the cities.34
33. See James A. Barnes, Tainted Triumph?, 7 NAT'L J. 2537, 2537-41 (1992).
34. Statistics in this section come from the following sources: BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SLOW ECONOMIC GROWTH LOWERS MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD IN-
COME AND INCREASES POVERTY RATE IN 1991 (1992); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-60, No. 180, MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND
PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1991 (1992); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, SERIES P-60, No. 181, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1991 (1992); BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-60, No. 177, TRENDS IN RELATIVE
INCOME: 1964 TO 1989 (1991); FRANK S. LEVY & RICHARD C. MICHEL, THE ECONOMIC
FUTURE OF AMERICAN FAMILIES 1-132 (1991); KATHERINE MCFATE, POVERTY, INEQUAL-
ITY AND THE CRISIS OF SOCIAL POLICY (1991); LAWRENCE MISHEL & DAVID FRANKEL,
THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA: 1990-1991 (1991); ISAAC SHAPIRO & ROBERT GREEN-
STEIN, SELECTIVE PROSPERITY: INCREASE INCOME DISPARITIES SINCE 1977 (1991); Julie
Kosterlitz, Measuring Misery, 22 NAT'L J. 1892, 1892 (1990); Paul Krugman, The Rich, the
Right, and the Facts, AM. PROSPECT, Fall 1992, at 19, 19-31; Patricia Ruggles, Measuring
Poverty, Focus, Spring 1992, at 1, 1-9; Jason DeParle, House Data on U.S. Income Sets Off
Debate on Fairness, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1992, at A16; Sylvia Nasar, A Very Good Time for
the Very Rich, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1992, at Al; Robert Pear, Ranks of U.S. Poor Reach 35.7
Million, the Most Since '64, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1992, at Al; David Wessel, The Wealthy
Watch Gains of 1980s Become Political Liabilities, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1992, at Al; Poverty
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In that decade, junk-bond junkies, merger maniacs, and savings and
loan speculators rode roughshod over the American economy. Corpo-
rate CEOs paid themselves large salaries and bonuses, while laying off
workers and busting unions. The Reagan-Bush White House cut taxes
for the wealthy, theorizing that the wealthy would invest their money so
that the benefit's would "trickle down" to the middle class and the poor.
Federal funds available for domestic problem solving were reduced
significantly.
While the wealthiest Americans prospered, most families did not
benefit from the decade's growth. The richest 1% of the population re-
ceived 60% of the economic growth. Their average pre-tax family in-
come swelled from $315,000 in 1977 to $560,000 in 1989. By the end of
the decade, according to the Wall Street Journal, the 2.5 million Ameri-
cans at the top of the income scale were taking in as much each year as
the 100 million people at the bottom.
Between 1980 and 1989, average hourly wages fell more than 9%.
Hourly benefits-such as pensions, health insurance, and paid time off-
fell by 13.8%. The vast majority of workers saw their wages and their
spending power decline. American families worked more hours and
weeks. For middle-class families, only the addition of another income-
typically a working wife-kept their overall household income steady.
At the same time, the bottom 40% of families had actual declines in
household income.
In 1991, 14.2% of all Americans-and 21.8% of all children-lived
below the official poverty line. The number of poor Americans-35.7
million-represents the most poor people since 1964. The poverty rate
was 11.6% in 1980, 12.8% in 1989, and 14.2% in 1991. The number of
poor increased by 4.2 million between 1989 and 1991 alone. During the
past three decades, thanks to federal social policies, poverty among the
elderly has declined dramatically, while poverty among young families
has increased.
But poverty is actually much worse than official figures show. Ac-
cording to Patricia Ruggles of the Urban Institute, the government's offi-
cial poverty line ($13,924 for a family of four) is based on out-of-date
standards (originally calculated in the early 1960s) and "does not reflect
Levels, Rates and Ranks: Places with Population Greater than 50,000 (information compiled
for author by the Bureau of the Census, 1992); Two Million More Americans Become Poor as
Recession Hits and Wages and Incomes Decline (background memo prepared by the Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, Sept. 26, 1991); New Census Report Shows Dramatic Rise
Since 1979 in Workers with Low Earnings [hereinafter New Census Report] (background
memo prepared by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, May 11, 1992).
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a realistic minimum level of living.""5  Using Ruggles's updated stan-
dards, the poverty rate would climb to over 23%, while more than 50
million Americans-and one of every three children-would be consid-
ered poor.
In addition to an increase in the overall number of poor Americans,
the poor are now poorer, and they are poorer for a longer period of time,
than a decade earlier. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the poor also
got a smaller share of the nation's income: In 1979 the poorest 20% of
the population had 5.1% of the country's pre-tax income; by 1991, their
share fell to 3.8% of the total.
Most poor Americans are white, but the poverty rate among blacks
(32.7%), Hispanics (28.7%), and Asians (13.8%), is higher than the rate
among whites (11.3%). During 1989-91, however, poverty increased
among every race and in every region of the country. More than 60% of
poor blacks, 59% of poor Hispanics, and 34% of poor whites live in
central cities.
In fact, the poor are increasingly concentrated in America's cities.
Using the official poverty standards, the percentage of poor people living
in cities increased from 30% in 1968 to 43.1% in 1989. Nationwide,
about one-fifth (19%) of central city residents are poor, but in some cities
the figures are much higher. 36 The poverty rates among children in ma-
jor cities are even more dramatic.37
During the past decade, much attention was paid to the so-called
"urban underclass"-poor people who live in "ghetto" neighborhoods
(where at least 40% of the population is poor). Some observers believe
that this concentration of poverty exacerbates the problems associated
with being poor: high rates of crime, dependency on welfare, slum hous-
ing, drug use, chronic unemployment, and other problems. But while
much attention was paid to "ghetto" neighborhoods, most of the urban
poor do not live in such areas. In 1980, for example, there were 2.4 mil-
lion poor people living in ghettos.38
35. PATRICIA RUGGLES, DRAWING THE LINE: ALTERNATIVE POVERTY MEASURES
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 30 (1990).
36. For example, about one-third of the entire population in Detroit, New Orleans, Cam-
den, and Miami, and over one-quarter of the population in Philadelphia, Chicago, Lawrence
(Mass.), Hartford, Atlanta, Newark, Buffalo, Cleveland, St. Louis, Youngstown, El Paso,
Provo, and New York lives in poverty.
37. The poverty rates for children in the following cities are: New Orleans (38.7%), Balti-
more (32.5%), New York (31.8%), Memphis (31.6%), Detroit (31.5%), Cleveland (31.3%),
Boston (30.9%), Chicago (30.8%), and Philadelphia (30%).
38. Inner City Poverty in the United States 1 (Lawrence E. Lynn, Jr. & Michael G. H.
McGeary eds., 1990); see Mark Littman, Poverty Areas and the Underclass: Untangling the
Web, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1991, at 19, 19-32.
1364 [Vol. 71
THE URBAN CRISIS
B. Homelessness
During the 1980s, a new element entered the landscape of America's
cities-homeless people sleeping in alleyways and subways, in cars, and
on park benches. A New York Times poll in 1990 reported that 68% of
urban Americans see the homeless in the course of their daily routine.
Nationally, the figure was 54%, an 18% increase in four years.3 9 Since
the early 1980s, the USCM has conducted an annual survey of homeless-
ness in major American cities. Despite the period's economic growth,
each year the study has found that the demands by people seeking emer-
gency housing increased substantially from the previous year. In 1991,
requests for emergency shelter increased 13% on average in the cities
surveyed. The exact number of homeless people in America is uncertain,
and efforts by the Census Bureau to count the homeless have failed. The
most widely-cited report, conducted by the Urban Institute in 1987
(prior to the current recession), estimated the number of homeless at
600,000 on any given night and 1.2 million over the course of the year.'
As the 1980s began, the initial stereotype of a homeless person was
of an alcoholic or mentally ill middle-aged man or "bag lady"-many of
them victims of deinstitutionalization resulting from the Community
Mental Health Act of 1963. By mid-decade, however, surveys found that
families and children were the fastest growing subgroup among the
homeless population. In the 1991 USCM survey, children comprised
24% of the homeless population in the survey cities. In its 1990 survey,
the USCM found that about one-quarter of the homeless worked at part-
time or full-time jobs. Approximately one-third of homeless single men
are veterans. A 1988 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office, re-
viewing nine research studies, provided estimates of the number of men-
tally ill among the homeless that varied from ten to forty-seven percent.
Substance abusers, some of whom may be considered mentally ill, com-
prise perhaps one-third of America's homeless. Clearly a significant
number of homeless persons suffer some kind of personal pathology, but
this focus can be misleading. It is unclear, for example, how much of
their alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental illness is a result, rather than a
cause, of their homelessness. More importantly, when more low-rent
housing was available-including many rooming houses that were lost to
gentrification-even people on the margins of society could afford a roof
over their heads.
39. See JOEL BLAU, THE VISIBLE POOR: HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES 3
(1992).
40. MARTHA R. BURT, OVER THE EDGE: THE GROWTH OF HOMELESSNESS IN THE
1980s 13 (1992).
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Between 1970 and 1989, the income of households in the bottom
quartile dropped from $10,080 to $7,558 (in constant 1991 dollars).
Meanwhile, supply of low-rent apartments (affordable to bottom-quartile
households paying no more than 30% of income for rent) declined from
5.8 million units to only 2.8 million units. By 1989, there were 4.1 mil-
lion more poor households than low-rent apartments. More than 60% of
poor renters pay at least 70% of their meager income for housing.41 The
number of poor households living in overcrowded apartments-doub-
ling- or tripling-up--has increased. With no income cushion to fall back
on, millions of families are one missed rent check from eviction-and on
the brink of homelessness.
C. Infant Mortality
In the shadow of some of the world's most sophisticated medical
centers, infants in many urban neighborhoods die at rates comparable to
Third World countries. The nation's infant mortality rate in 1989 was
ten infant deaths per 1000 live births. Thus the United States ranks
twentieth in the world, behind much poorer countries such as Singapore,
Hong Kong, Spain, and Ireland. The rate of infant mortality in most
American cities, however, is significantly higher than the national rate.
In Washington, D.C., for example, in 1989 there were 22.9 infant deaths
per 1000 live births.42 Among blacks, the infant mortality rate is 18
deaths per 1000 live births. This, too, compares unfavorably with many
poorer countries; in fact, thirty nations-including Hungary, Poland,
and Cuba-have lower rates. Black children in cities are even more vul-
nerable.43 These dramatically high rates are linked to the results of pov-
erty: Poor pre-natal nutrition among low-income mothers which leads to
low birth-weight babies and lack of access to nutritional and medical
care, such as immunizations.
D. Violent Crime
In 1991 alone, 26,250 people were murdered in the United States, an
increase of 21% in five years, according to the National Center for
41. EDWARD B. LAZERE ET AL., SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND CALIFORNIA, A PLACE TO
CALL HOME: THE CRISIS IN HOUSING FOR THE POOR xi (1990).
42. Figures for other cities include the following: Detroit (21.1 per 1000), Philadelphia
(17.6 per 1000), Chicago (17.0 per 1000), Memphis (16.7 per 1000), and Cleveland (16.3 per
1000).
43. This is suggested by black infant mortality rates in the following cities: Washington
(26.5 per 1000), Detroit (23.9 per 1000), Philadelphia (23.5 per 1000), Los Angeles (22.9 per
1000), Chicago (22.4 per 1000), Indianapolis (21.8 per 1000), Columbus (21.1 per 1000), Phoe-
nix (21.0 per 1000), San Diego (20.3 per 1000), and Cleveland (20.0 per 1000).
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Health Statistics (NCHS).44 This is the highest murder rate of any major
nation. Many cities set new homicide records that year, but local officials
expect that the trend will continue upward despite the fact that the dem-
ographic group with the most offenders (teenage males) is declining as a
percentage of the population.
The rising murder rate reflects a growing epidemic of violence in the
United States, particularly in its cities. According to the National Crime
Survey (NCS), 5.8 million violent crime offenses occurred in the United
States during 1989, including 135,410 rapes, 1.1 million robberies, and
4.63 million assaults. According to the NCS, however, only 45% of vio-
lent crime offenses are reported to the police. Approximately 5% of all
households nationwide had a member who experienced one or more vio-
lent crimes.
America has the highest crime rate in the industrialized world. A
murder is committed every twenty-five minutes, a rape every six minutes,
a burglary every ten seconds, and a larceny every four seconds. About
three-quarters of Americans age twelve and over will be assaulted in their
lifetime, and a third of them will be robbed. Two of every five Americans
will be injured in an assault or robbery. Eight percent of American wo-
men will be raped.
While these statistics are frightening, causing many Americans to
live in fear, the likelihood that a person will be a victim of a crime varies
dramatically depending on where he or she lives. Although the media
and some politicians play to the fears of middle-class suburbanites (such
as George Bush's "Willie Horton" advertisements in the 1988 cam-
paign), the reality is that inner-city residents are the most frequent vic-
tims of violent crime.
People who live in cities, particularly large cities, are more likely to
be victims of violent crime (40.6 offenses per 1000 residents) than subur-
banites (26 per 1000) or rural dwellers (21.1 per 1000). Poor people are
44. Statistics in this section come from the following sources: MARC MAUER, AMERI-
CANS BEHIND BARS, WASH., D.C.: THE SENTENCING PROJECT (1992); U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENT CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (1991); W.
John Moore, Crime Pays, 23 NAT'L J. 1218, 1218 (1991); Dennis Cauchon, "Lock 'em Up
Policy" Under Attack, USA TODAY, Sept. 1, 1992, at 4A; Dennis Cauchon & Desda Moss,
Doctors Vow to Wage War on Violence, USA TODAY, June 10, 1992, at 1A; John Childs,
Partners in Crime, Z, June 1991, at 84-86; Philip J. Hilts, More Teenagers Being Slain by Guns,
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1992, at A19; Jonathan Marshall, How Our War on Drugs Shattered the
Cities, WASH. POST, May 17, 1992, at Cl; Michel McQueen, People with the Least to Fear from
Crime Drive the Crime Issue, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1992, at Al; Barry Weisberg, The Seduc-
tion of Violence, NAT'L BAR ASS'N MAG., Apr. 1991, at 17, 17-18; Around U.S., Cities Con-
front a Record Year for Homicides, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 22, 1991, at 25; Crime Peril Said
Double in Cities, BOSTON GLOBE, June 8, 1992, at 8; Violent Crime by Young is Up 25% in 10
Years, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1992, at 1-27.
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at higher risk of experiencing violent crime than others. Blacks are more
likely than whites to be victims of a violent crime. Overall, 4.4% of
blacks, 3.9% of Hispanics, and 3.4% of whites were victims of violent
crime in 1989. Violent crimes typically involve members of the same
race. In 1990, 72% of violent crimes committed against whites were
committed by other whites, while 84% of violent crimes committed
against blacks were committed by other blacks.
Murder is the nation's tenth leading killer. It is the leading cause of
death among black teenagers. A study of eighty urban areas found that
from 1987 to 1989, more than one out of every thousand black males
aged fifteen to nineteen was murdered. In some cities, including Wash-
ington, D.C., Los Angeles, Detroit, and Jacksonville, the rate was double
the national average. Although blacks represent only twelve percent of
the nation's population, they comprise half of all murder victims. In
fact, blacks are six times more likely than whites to be murdered. The
rate of homicide among teenagers in suburbs (5 per 100,000) is substan-
tially lower than in large cities (28 per 100,000).
Almost two-thirds of all murders (64%) involve firearms, especially
handguns. In a recent survey in five cities, 28% of inner-city high school
males said they had been threatened with a gun; 17% have actually been
shot at. Emergency rooms at inner-city hospitals report a growing
number of patients hurt by gunfire. A study at King Drew Medical
Center in Los Angeles found that in 1985 only 19% of its patients suf-
fered from gunshot wounds. By 1991, that figure grew to 51%.
The rising violence in American society is linked to the epidemic of
drugs. In Washington, D.C., for example, the rate of homicides identi-
fied as drug-related increased from 21% in 1985 to 80% in 1988. Many
poor inner-city residents turn to crime to pay for their drug use. But
some studies suggest that, while much of the drug sales take place in
America's ghettoes, much of the drug use takes place elsewhere. A Rand
Corporation survey in 1985 found that only 22.8% of cocaine users in
the Washington, D.C. area actually lived in the city; most (77.2%) users
live in the Virginia and Maryland suburbs. The inner city serves, in ef-
fect, as a drug supermarket-the wholesalers and consumers live else-
where, but the "street traffic" among retail drug dealers takes place in
cities, where competition for the market generates violent crime. Law
enforcement officials focus their efforts on inner-city drug dealing, rather
than white buyers in suburban communities.
The United States has the highest rate of incarceration in the
world-ten times more prisoners per capita than Japan or than any
Western European nation. More than 1.2 million inmates were held in
the nation's prisons in 1991-more than double the figure in 1980.
1368 [Vol. 71
THE URBAN CRISIS
Blacks, 12% of the nation's population, make up 44% of those in local,
state, and federal prisons. A disproportionately high number of these
blacks come from low-income backgrounds in inner cities.
The dramatic rise in the prison population is linked to the "war on
drugs," and its long mandatory sentences for drug offenders. In 1980,
25% of federal prison inmates were incarcerated on drug charges. By
1992, drug offenders represented 58% of the federal prison population
and are projected to fill 69% of prison beds by 1995. Since 1987, these
prisoners have made up three-quarters of new inmates. About 70% of
federal anti-drug funding is directed toward law enforcement, while only
30% is tied to treatment and prevention. As a result, only a tiny propor-
tion of prison inmates in need of drug treatment actually receive any
treatment. Furthermore, the "get tough" policy, putting more Ameri-
cans behind bars, has obviously not solved the crime problem, since the
violent crime rate has grown dramatically during the 1980s. Despite the
doubling of the prison population, few Americans feel safer than they did
a decade ago.
In 1991 alone, the U.S. spent $20.1 billion on building and operating
prisons. Adding in the costs of taking care of people on probation and
parole, the total rose to $26.2 billion. These costs-plus the additional
costs for police and courts-contribute to the fiscal crises facing state and
local governments.
E. Segregation
America's metropolitan areas are racially segregated: Within met-
ropolitan areas, and within cities, whites, blacks, Hispanics, and other
minorities are increasingly isolated from each other. Sociologists have
coined the term "hypersegregation" to describe this pattern.45 The 1990
U.S. census shows that 30% of black Americans live in virtually all-
black (90% or more black) neighborhoods. Most other blacks live in
neighborhoods that are still overwhelmingly black. Sixty-two percent of
non-Hispanic blacks live in blocks that are 60% or more black. Forty
percent of the Hispanic population live in blocks that are 60% or more
Hispanic. At least two out of every three white Americans live in essen-
45. Data in this section draws on the following sources: Dan Gilimor & Stephen K. Doig,
Segregation Forever?, 14 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Jan. 1992, at 48; Douglas S. Massey & Nancy
K. Denton, Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 373, 373-91
(1989); Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, Suburbanization and Segregation in U.S. Met-
ropolitan Areas, 94 AM. J. Soc. 592, 592-626 (1988); William P. O'Hare & William H. Frey,
Booming, Suburban and Black, 14 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Sept. 1992, at 30; David J. Dent, The
New Black Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1992, (Magazine) at 6; David Judkins et al., Pat-
terns of Residential Concentrations by Race and Hispanic Origin (Mar. 20, 1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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tially all-white neighborhoods. In the largest 50 metropolitan areas,
37% of blacks live in all-black neighborhoods. In most major American
cities, more than 70% of the population would have to move to achieve
proportional integration.
The 1980s witnessed a growing gap between the black poor and the
black middle class. Many middle-class blacks moved out of urban ghet-
toes. However, most did not relocate to integrated neighborhoods; in-
stead they moved to segregated middle-class neighborhoods within cities
or in adjacent suburbs. Hispanics experienced the same trends, as did
Asians, but to a lesser extent.
F. Crumbling Infrastructure
Periodically, when a major bridge collapses, a dam or sewer system
bursts, or a train derails-causing death or costing huge sums to repair-
media attention and political debate is drawn temporarily to the
problems of America's crumbling infrastructure.
America is sitting on a fragile foundation. Its roads, bridges, mass
transit, airports, ports and waterways, sewers, wastewater treatment fa-
cilities, and solid waste disposal facilities are out-of-date and in disrepair.
In most metropolitan areas, traffic is gridlocked. Congestion and flight
delays at most airports are now the rule, not the exception. The U.S.
also lags far behind other industrial nations in creating a modem, high-
speed rail system. During the past decade, several major reports ex-
amined the nation's capital investment needs; the estimates ranged from
$37.8 billion to $140.5 billion per year.
Without a strong infrastructure, neither people nor goods can be
moved efficiently. Capital plants must be maintained and, over time, re-
built. In older areas with deteriorating facilities, and in newer areas with
rapid population growth, new facilities must be built. Except for high-
ways, most urban infrastructure systems-transit, water, sewer-are a
century old and far beyond their useful lives. Boston has lead in its
pipes. New York City's century-old water mains regularly give out at
key intersections. Los Angeles's old waste landfills are ruined by toxic
wastes." In New York State alone, 68% of its bridges (11,808 out of
17,313) are either structurally deficient or functionally obsolete-that is,
inadequate for current traffic.47
46. Donna Shalala & Julia Vitullo-Martin, Rethinking the Urban Crisis: Proposals for a
National Urban Agenda, 55 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 3, 6 (1989).
47. THE CASE FOR A NEW STATE-LOCAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM 6 (1991) (state-
ment of Richard P. Nathan); see Marshall Kaplan, Infrastructure Policy, Repetitive Studies,
Uneven Response, Next Steps, 25 URB. AFF. Q. 371, 371-88 (1990); Felix Rohatyn, What the
Government Should Do, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 25, 1992, at 26, 26-27.
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America's 83,000 local governments are responsible for managing
and maintaining over 70% of the nation's public works facilities. Three-
quarters of the 250 million trips made by Americans each day are made
in metropolitan areas; over 80% of these trips are made in private cars.
The public transit systems in many cities-which millions of people, es-
pecially the poor, rely on-are physically deteriorating, but consumers
cannot afford major fare increases to pay for repairs and replacement.
Cities lack the resources to build and repair their crumbling infrastruc-
ture, undermining the economies of their regions and the country. De-
spite this problem, federal grants to state and local governments for
public works projects have declined dramatically. In the 1980s, non-mil-
itary public investment in the U.S. fell to 2.4% of GNP-half of the
1970s rate, and one-quarter of that during the 1950s and 1960s.
According to the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), a major public
works investment will boost the private economy and overall economic
prosperity. EPI found that a dollar spent today on public infrastructure
produces from two to five times more payoff in GNP growth than a dol-
lar spent on tax cuts or deficit reduction.48
G. Fiscal Trauma
Cities, trapped by rising costs, shrinking resources, and inexpand-
able borders, are now confronting fiscal calamity. Many cities face bank-
ruptcy and are operating under severe austerity budgets. In the past few
years, Bridgeport, Connecticut, East St. Louis, Illinois, and Chelsea,
Massachusetts plunged into bankruptcy. A number of other cities, in-
cluding Philadelphia and New York, teeter on the edge of insolvency.
To avert fiscal collapse, many cities have closed schools, hospitals,
health centers, police stations, and fire stations. They have laid off essen-
tial employees and reduced basic services, such as maintaining parks, re-
pairing roads, and enforcing housing and health codes. A 1992 survey of
620 municipalities found that 53.9% were running deficits, 39.5% had
cut work forces, and 61.2% reduced their capital investments.49
A number of factors contribute to this deepening fiscal crisis: City
residents, who are increasingly poor, cannot pay sufficient taxes, but they
require more services. Further, most cities are responsible for providing
services not only to residents, but also to commuters and tourists, neither
of whom pay taxes. Meanwhile, the cost of providing public services has
increased. Beginning in the 1980s, three phenomena-homelessness,
48. DAVID ASCHAUER, PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND PRIVATE SECTOR GROWTH 16
(1990).
49. MICHAEL PAGANO, CITY FISCAL CONDITIONS IN 1992, at v-viii (1992).
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crack cocaine, and AIDS-placed additional burdens on city services.
These trends were exacerbated by both the federal and state govern-
ments' dramatic cuts in fiscal assistance to local governments.
Many states impose restrictions on cities' ability to raise revenues.
Even if cities were allowed greater leeway, however, they would be
caught in a fiscal Catch-22. Poor residents cannot afford to pay higher
taxes or fees, but city officials fear that imposing higher taxes on affluent
residents or business would induce them to leave, aggravating the fiscal
crisis.
In America's Ailing Cities, Helen Ladd and John Yinger conclude
that "[a]lthough the financial difficulties of these cities may be exacer-
bated by politics or management practices .... [t]he policy tools avail-
able to city officials are weak compared to the impact on city finances of
national economic, social, and fiscal trends."50
IV. ROOT CAUSES
The plight of America's cities will not be solved without addressing
the root causes of urban decline. These include five major trends and
federal policies that have undermined the economic, social, and political
health of cities.
A. Corporate Flight and Economic Restructuring
The electronics revolution has hastened the development of a global
economy and footloose multinational corporations. Since the early
1970s, there has been a tremendous flight of previously high-wage (pri-
marily manufacturing) industries from U.S. cities to locations with more
"favorable" business conditions-low wages, weak or nonexistent un-
ions, and lax environmental laws-found mainly in suburbs, rural areas,
and Third World countries."1 The U.S. government promoted this flight
with national tax policies that encouraged business to relocate to new
sites (rather than modernizing and expanding their plants and equipment
50. HELEN F. LADD & JOHN YINGER, AMERICA'S AILING CITIES: FISCAL HEALTH
AND THE DESIGN OF URBAN POLICY 292 (1991).
51. For example, the percentage of overall employment in manufacturing in major cities
declined dramatically between 1953 and 1970 and again between 1970 and 1986. The respective
figures for 1953, 1970, and 1986, respectively, in the following cities are: New York City,
35.9%, 25.8%, 14.8%; Philadelphia, 45.5%, 33.3%, 16.7%; Boston, 28.4%, 18.1%, 9.0%;
Baltimore, 38.1%, 28.6%, 17.1%; St. Louis, 44.9%, 35.3%, 23.0%; Atlanta, 27.4%, 19.4%,
12.8%; Houston, 26.8%, 23.1%, 14.0%; Denver, 24.7%, 19.0%, 11.3%; and San Francisco,
20.3%, 14.7%, 9.4%. See John D. Kasarda, Structural Factors Affecting the Location and
Timing of Urban Underclass Growth, 11 IUra. GEOGRAPHY 234, 234-64 (1990) (discussing the
demographic and economic conditions underlying the differential rise of urban poverty in
northern cities).
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in cities) and with foreign policies that propped up Third World govern-
ments that suppress dissent.
According to demographer John Kasarda:
The largest cities of the North spawned our industrial revolu-
tion in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, generating mas-
sive numbers of blue-collar jobs that served to attract and
economically upgrade millions of disadvantaged migrants.
More recently, these same cities were instrumental in trans-
forming the U.S. economy from goods processing to basic serv-
ices (during the 1950s and 1960s) and from a basic service
economy to one of information processing and administrative
control (during the 1970s and 1980s).52
In the process, many blue-collar jobs that once constituted the eco-
nomic backbone of cities and provided the employment opportunities for
their poorly educated residents have either vanished or moved. These
jobs have been replaced, at least in part, by knowledge-intensive white-
collar jobs with educational requirements that exclude many with sub-
standard educations.53 Since 1980, the Fortune 500 industrial companies
have eliminated 3.9 million employees from their payrolls. Between 1978
and 1982 alone, Los Angeles lost about 70,000 high-paying manufactur-
ing jobs, much of it concentrated in the predominantly black neighbor-
hoods of south central L.A. Firms like General Motors and Bethlehem
Steel relocated or closed their plants. Textile sweatshops, employing un-
documented immigrants at below minimum wages, represent the only
growth in Los Angeles's manufacturing sector. At the same time, in Los
Angeles and other metropolitan areas, employment growth areas
emerged in outlying suburban areas, especially in the light manufactur-
ing, high technology, and retail services sectors.
In a global economy, cities have little control over local economic
conditions, but in the absence of any federal effort to help cities, Ameri-
can cities have to compete with each other for tax revenue. This has led
to an unhealthy bidding war to attract private capital investment, al-
lowing multinational firms to pit cities against cities, states against states,
and even the U.S. against other countries to bring jobs and tax base reve-
nue. In many cases, local efforts to improve the local "business climate"
often mean lowering wages, health and safety standards, and environ-
52. John D. Kasarda, City Jobs and Residents on a Collision Course: The Urban Under-
class Dilemma, 4 ECON. DEv. Q. 313, 313 (1990) [hereinafter Kasarda, Collision Course]; see
John D. Kasarda, Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass, 501 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. SOC. SCi. 26, 26-47 (1989).
53. See Kasarda, Collision Course, supra note 52, at 313.
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mental safeguards.14
During the 1970s and 1980s, some cities sought to revitalize their
downtowns with new office buildings, medical and educational com-
plexes, hotels, urban shopping malls, convention centers, and sports com-
plexes. For example, in 1970 only fifteen cities could have handled a
trade show for 20,000 people; by the late 1980s, some 150 cities could do
80.
5 5
To cope with disinvestment and fiscal crises, many city development
officials became "entrepreneurs," competing with other cities for corpo-
rate investment. Some cities sought to lure businesses with tax breaks
and other subsidies (such as the $100 million tax abatements granted
Trump Tower in New York). Many economists claim that the bidding
war has gone too far. They view these incentives and subsidies as unnec-
essary give-aways; this private investment, they argue, would have taken
place anyway. One expert observed: "Corporations are playing cities
like a piano. They understand the tune. But the cities don't."56 But
many city officials view these subsidies as important ammunition in the
competitive war for new business and jobs. (This debate continues today
over the effectiveness of urban "enterprise zones" for attracting jobs and
businesses to inner cities.)
Of course, many cities could not compete on an equal footing-due
to the lack of either good locations or adequate resources. Cities were
not equally successful in making the economic transition from producing
goods to producing information. Many cities tried, without much suc-
cess, to retain existing blue-collar jobs, or to lure new developers, tour-
ists, and jobs. According to Bernard Frieden, "most large northeastern
and midwestern cities lost manufacturing jobs faster than they gained
54. For a discussion of the potentials and limitations of progressive "redistributive" poli-
cies at the local level, see RESTRUCTURING THE CITY (Susan Fainstein et al. eds., 1986); UNE-
QUAL PARTNERSHIPS (Gregory D. Squires ed., 1989); Pierre Clavel & Nancy Kleniewski,
Space for Progressive Local Policy: Examples from the United States and the United Kingdom,
in BEYOND THE CITY LIMITS 199-234 (John Logan & Todd Swanstrom eds., 1990); Richard
F. DeLeon, The Urban Antiregime: Progressive Politics in San Francisco, 27 URB. AFF. Q. 555,
555-79 (1992); Peter Dreier & Bruce Ehrlich, Downtown Development and Urban Reform: The
Politics of Boston's Linkage Policy, 26 URB. Ann. Q. 354, 354-75 (1991); Peter Dreier & W.
Dennis Keating, The Limits of Localism: Progressive Housing Policies in Boston, 1984-1989, 26
URB. AFF. Q. 191, 191-216 (1990).
55. BERNARD FRIEDEN & LYNNE SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC. 270 (1989).
56. Robert Guskind, Games Cities Play, 21 NAT'L J. 634, 634 (1989); see Peggy McCar-
thy, City Wars, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 23, 1992, at 53; John Schwartz et al., Can You Top
This? NEWSWEEK, Feb. 17, 1992, at 40 (describing the competition between Hartford, Conn.
and nearby Springfield, Mass. to attract businesses).
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white-collar ones. '" 5 7 As a result, many American cities still have not
recovered from the loss of blue-collar industry and jobs. As factories
closed down and waterfronts were left vacant, downtown department
stores went out of business. 58 Neighborhood business districts that had
provided many retail stores and local jobs declined.5 9 The tax bases of
many cities suffered, making it more difficult for local governments to
provide municipal services. The devastation of Youngstown, Detroit,
Flint, Newark, Camden, Bridgeport, and Gary is perhaps the most visi-
ble symbol of the decline of American manufacturing in the global
economy.
Sadly, even those cities that did successfully revitalize their down-
town economies have not stemmed the growing tide of poverty only
blocks away from the glittering glass and steel. Not surprisingly, the
percentage of America's poor living in cities grew from 30% in 1968 to
37% in 1979 to 43.1% in 1989.
Why? The service economy is predominantly a low-wage economy,
and most of its jobs offer no career ladder or upward mobility. The
"working poor" is the fastest-growing sector of the nation's poverty pop-
ulation. A recent Census Bureau study found that almost one-fifth of all
full-time workers now earn poverty-level wages ($12,195 in 1990). In
1979, 12.1% of all full-time year-round workers earned poverty-level
wages. By 1990, the percentage grew to 18%, or 14.4 million workers.
Among white workers, 17.1% received poverty wages; among black
workers, 25.3%; among Hispanic workers, 31.4%. One-fourth of wo-
men workers (24.3%) and one-seventh (13.9%) of male workers earned
wages below the poverty line.6°
As William J. Wilson points out in The Truly Disadvantaged, the
urban poor-disproportionately people of color and young people-face
a widening mismatch between their skills and available jobs. 61 The exo-
dus of many jobs, particularly entry-level jobs, to suburban locations ex-
acerbated the problem, creating, according to Christopher Jencks, "the
57. Bernard J. Frieden, The Downtown Job Puzzle, 97 PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1989, at 71,
73.
58. This trend continues. See Sarah Lyall, In Downtown Syracuse, the Streets Get Emp-
tier, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1992, at B1; Stephanie Strom, Macy Says It Will Close 8 Stores,
Including 4 in the New York Area, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1992, at Al; Charles Strum, Newark
Journal; No Miracle on Market Street for Final Retail Holdout, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1992, at
B4.
59. See Bill Turque et al., Where the Food Isn't: Supermarkets Have Fled the Inner Cities,
Leaving the Poor to Pay More for Less, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 1992, at 36.
60. See New Census Report, supra note 34.
61. WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UN-
DERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 39-46 (1987).
1993] 1375
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
difficulty inner-city residents have finding a job many miles from home
and the difficulty they have reaching such a job once they find it."62
Some argue that the key factor is not workers' inadequate skills or
education, but the overall labor market and, in the case of minorities,
discrimination. Some suggest that in a tight job market with low unem-
ployment, even unskilled workers have better job prospects. Between
1958-60 and 1968-70, the overall unemployment rate fell from 6% to
4%, and the unemployment rate among black high school dropouts fell
from 16% to 9%. By 1978-80, overall unemployment rose to 6%; unem-
ployment among black high school dropouts rose to 21%. Among white
high school dropouts it increased from 5% to 11%.63 During the mid
1980s, the Boston area experienced an economic boom, with overall un-
employment below 3% by 1985. Black unemployment that year was
down to 5.6%.
But as the American economy restructures-in terms of the types,
earnings, and locations of jobs-central city residents without appropri-
ate skills suffer, even when overall unemployment is relatively low. The
educational requirements of most jobs are growing. Therefore, even
though the number of young people completing high school is growing
among all races,64 the opportunities for those who do not complete high
school (or who complete high school without acquiring the necessary
skills) are declining. Between 1973 and 1989, the annual incomes of low-
skilled white men in their twenties fell by 14%; for blacks, 24%. In-
comes for white male high school dropouts in their twenties fell by 33%;
for blacks, 50%.
B. Suburban Exodus
Since World War II, the United States has witnessed one of the most
dramatic population shifts in its history-the movement of Americans
from cities to suburbs. Suburbanization is actually part of a larger trend,
reflected in three interrelated demographic shifts: from the Snowbelt
(the older industrial regions of the North and Midwest) to the Sunbelt
62. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY AND THE
UNDERCLASS 123 (1992). For in-depth discussion of the effects of economic change on urban
minorities, see JAMES H. JOHNSON JR. & MELVIN L. OLIVER, ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING
AND BLACK MALE JOBLESSNESS IN U.S. METROPOLITAN AREAS (1991); James Rosenbaum
& Susan J. Popkin, Why Don't Welfare Mothers Get Jobs? A Test of the Culture of Poverty
and Spatial Mismatch Hypotheses (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
63. JENCKS, supra note 52, at 125.
64. In 1970, 44% of blacks and 22% of whites in their early twenties had not completed
high school. By 1985, the figures were 19% for blacks and 13% for whites. Id. at 128.
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(the South and Southwest); from rural to metropolitan areas; and, within
metropolitan areas, from central cities to suburbs.
Some observers have concluded that America's postwar suburban
migration in so short a period was a "natural" evolution, a result of mil-
lions of separate decisions by individual consumers seeking a single-fam-
ily home, improved public schools, and a better life for their families. It
is often described as the "white flight" or "suburban exodus" of consum-
ers anxious to leave troubled neighborhoods for greener pastures.
In reality, the power brokers in America's corporate board rooms
and developers' suites, and their allies in the White House and Congress,
played a critical role in this suburbanization. As historian Kenneth Jack-
son describes in Crabgrass Frontier, these consumer choices were shaped
(in fact, subsidized) by federal government policies that both pushed peo-
ple out of cities and pulled them into suburbs. These included highway-
building policies that opened up the hinterlands to speculation and devel-
opment; housing policies that offered government-insured mortgages to
whites in suburbia (but not in cities); and bulldozer urban renewal poli-
cies that destroyed working class neighborhoods, scattering their resi-
dents to blue-collar suburbs, to make way for downtown business
development." Likewise, as described below, the population shift from
the Snowbelt to the Sunbelt followed the move of business, subsidized by
federal tax policy and anti-union laws and by the siting of Pentagon facil-
ities and contracts.
This population shift, while not inevitable, is quite dramatic. Dur-
ing the first two-thirds of this century, immigrants from abroad (mostly
Europe) and from rural parts of the United States (mostly the South)
moved to the booming manufacturing cities of the North and Midwest.
In the past few decades, immigration from abroad has stemmed primar-
ily from Mexico, Latin America, and Asia-and the primary ports of
entry are Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, Miami, Houston, and
other sunbelt cities. Likewise, internal migration within the United
States has shifted to the South and Southwest regions.
At the same time, America's metropolitan areas grew significantly.
The nation's 284 metropolitan areas now have a total of 192.7 million
residents and account for 77.5% of the U.S. population. During the
1980s, metropolitan areas grew by 11.6%, while nonmetropolitan areas
grew by only 3.9%. In that decade, the largest metropolitan areas (those
exceeding one million in population) grew the fastest (led by Sunbelt ar-
65. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF
AMERICA 190-218, 283-87 (1985); see Robert Fishman, Megalopolis Unbound, 14 WILSON Q.,
Winter 1990, at 25-48.
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eas), while smaller metropolitan areas grew more slowly or, like Youngs-
town, Utica, Dubuque, Duluth, or Wheeling, declined. The thirty-nine
metropolitan areas with a population of over one million comprise over
half (50.1%) of the nation's population. (In 1950, there were only four-
teen metropolitan areas with as many as one million residents, account-
ing for under thirty percent of the U.S. population). Of these thirty-nine
largest metropolitan areas, only five (Detroit, Cleveland, Pittsburgh,
New Orleans, and Buffalo) experienced overall population decline during
the 1980s.
Since the turn of the century, while metropolitan areas grew as a
proportion of the nation's overall population, the suburban share of the
metro population has grown steadily. This process accelerated beginning
with the 1950s. In 1950, cities accounted for 32.8% of the nation's popu-
lation; suburbs, 23.3%. By 1960, cities still had a small margin over the
suburbs, 32.8% to 30.9%; but by 1970, the suburbs (37.6%) had sur-
passed the cities (31.4%). By 1980, cities had 30% of the nation's popu-
lation, compared with 44.8% for suburbs. By 1990, the cities had
31.3%, while the suburbs had 46.1%."
Since the 1960s, and especially in the past decade, most older indus-
trial cities lost population. During the past three decades, St. Louis lost
nearly half its population; Detroit lost more than one-third; Boston, At-
lanta, Philadelphia, and New Orleans lost more than one-fifth. At the
same time, Sunbelt cities like Houston, Miami, Phoenix, and Los Angeles
increased in population.
In every region of the country-even where city populations are in-
creasing-the fastest-growing parts of the metropolitan areas are the sur-
rounding suburbs.6 7 Los Angeles, for example, grew by 17.4%, while its
suburbs grew by 29.5%; Baltimore lost 6.4% of its population while its
suburbs grew by 16.5%. During the 1980s, only four of the thirty-nine
metropolitan areas with a population of over one million experienced
growth in the major central city at a rate more rapid than the metropoli-
tan area as a whole. One of these was New York City; in the other three
(Portland, Columbus, Charlotte), the city's growth was aided by large
annexations from the suburbs.
Two things, however, remain constant regardless of region or
whether the metropolitan area is growing or declining. First, city popu-
lations have gotten poorer. Second, the percentage of minorities in cities
66. These statistics are taken from WILLIAM FREY & ALDEN SPEARE JR., U.S. METRO-
POLITAN AREA POPULATION GROWTH 1960-1990: CENSUS TRENDS AND EXPLANATIONS
(1991); and BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, METROPOLITAN AREAS
AND CITIES: 1990 CENSUS PROFILE No. 3 (1991).
67. See WILSON, supra note 61.
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has grown dramatically; in many cities, people of color now comprise the
majority of the population.
America's cities now face a shrinking tax base and fiscal traumas.
In 1960, the per capita income of cities was 5% greater than their sur-
rounding suburbs. In 1980, the ratio had fallen to 89% below the sub-
urbs; by 1989, to 84%. In some metropolitan areas, the economic
disparities between city and suburbs are particularly acute. Newark's per
capita income was only 43.1% of its suburbs; Paterson, N.J., 46.6%;
Cleveland, 53.4%; Hartford, 53.6%; Detroit, 53.6%; Milwaukee, 62.9%;
Gary, 63.4%; Baltimore, 64.3%; Philadelphia, 65.4%; Dayton, 66%;
Chicago, 66.3%; Miami, 67.2%; and New York, 67.6%.68 As noted ear-
lier, however, these aggregate figures mask the variations among subur-
ban communities.
C. Pentagon Drain
The Pentagon has played a critical role in the flight of business, jobs,
and people from cities. During the postwar period, military spending has
accounted for the largest part of the federal budget. The Pentagon's de-
cisions to locate military facilities and to grant defense contracts has
greatly influenced the growth and decline of geographic areas. It has
served as America's de facto "industrial policy," a form of government
planning that has shaped dramatically the location of businesses and
jobs.
During World War II, the major sites of military manufacturing--
shipbuilding, the auto industry (which produced tanks and trucks for
war), and aerospace-were in major cities. After the war, those sites be-
gan to change due to the influence of Cold War priorities and politics,
including the influence of key congressmen in utilizing the "Pentagon
pork barrel" to bring jobs to firms and workers in their districts. The
multiplier (ripple) effects of Pentagon spending has dramatically changed
the population and employment map of the entire country.
In reality, Pentagon spending is highly concentrated geographically.
Most military installations are in rural (or once-rural) areas, while the
vast majority of production and research dollars are concentrated in a
few metropolitan locations. As Markusen and Yudken write:
Several major metropolitan areas in the nation are also highly
dependent upon defense spending, particularly the Los Angeles
and Boston areas, the Washington, D.C. area as a defense serv-
ices center, San Diego as a naval center, and Seattle as a one-
68. These statistics are taken from LEDEBUR & BARNES, supra note 27.
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company military-industrial city.69
The production of weapons and the undertaking of military research
and development has spawned new industries and new fields, but in do-
ing so, much of the nation's resources and scientific expertise have been
diverted from civilian production and research. Likewise, military pro-
duction and research and the siting of facilities has helped some areas
and drained others. Rather than employing research and development
funds to help modernize the nation's basic manufacturing industries, for
example the steel and automobile industries, or developing new civilian
industries to make the United States more competitive internationally,
for example, high speed rail, the Pentagon's priorities helped undermine
key industrial sectors and the cities where they were located.
Even in those metropolitan areas that have won the Pentagon
sweepstakes, however, the bulk of Pentagon dollars are located in sub-
urbs, not central cities. In 1990 alone, for example, eighteen out of the
twenty-five largest cities suffered a total loss of $24 billion in their bal-
ance of payments with the Pentagon. In Los Angeles, for example, tax-
payers sent $4.74 billion to the Pentagon and received only $1.47 billion
back-a net loss of $3.27 billion, or $3000 per family. That translates
into almost 100,000 jobs.70
A study by Employment Research Associates for the Boston Rede-
velopment Authority analyzed all of the money coming into each city
through military contracts and salaries. It then compared this sum to
the amount drained out of the city by federal taxes going to the Penta-
gon. The sums lost are enormous. New York City loses $8.4 billion a
year; Los Angeles, $3.3 billion; Chicago, $3.1 billion; Houston, $1.7 bil-
lion; Dallas, $731 million; and Detroit, over $900 million.7
The employment impact of this drain-off of funds is equally dra-
matic. Money going out means jobs lost. New York loses approximately
250,000 full-time jobs annually; Los Angeles and Chicago each lose
about 100,000 jobs; Houston, over 50,000 jobs; Detroit, about 30,000
jobs; and Dallas, 22,000 jobs. The biggest losers have been the nation's
industrial heartland, the areas surrounding the Great Lakes.
69. ANN MARKUSEN & JOEL YUDKEN, DISMANTLING THE COLD WAR ECONOMY 171
(1992); see also ANN MARKUSEN ET AL., THE RISE OF THE GUNBELT: THE MILITARY
REMAPPING OF INDUSTRIAL AMERICA (1991) (discussing the economic impact of the mili-
tary-industrial complex).
70. Report to the Boston Redevelopment Authority by Employment Research Associates,
Lansing, Michigan (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see Steven Green-
house, Study Says Big Cities Don't Get Fair Share of Military Spending, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
1992, at A20.
71. See Report to the Boston Redevelopment Authority, supra note 70; Greenhouse,
supra note 70, at A20.
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Even those cities gaining overall dollars and jobs from the -Pentagon
find that overdependence on military contracts has its downside, making
them vulnerable to "downturns in the military spending cycle."'72 For
example, both Seattle (dominated by Boeing, the nation's largest defense
contractor) and St. Louis (where defense contractor McDonnell-Douglas
is the largest employer) experienced severe economic hard times when
the Pentagon reduced its funding for specific weapon systems or selected
another contractor. Politics influences the rise and fall of regions and
cities as a result of Pentagon spending.73
The $1.3 billion emergency urban aid program, passed by Congress
after the L.A. riots and signed by President Bush last summer, pales in
comparison to what the Pentagon drains from America's cities. The De-
partment of Defense saps that much just from New York City every six
weeks.
D. Redlining
Redlining (discrimination in mortgage lending) by banks and insur-
ance companies leads to a self-fulfilling prophecy of urban neighborhood
decline.74 Since its enactment in 1977, federal bank regulators have
failed to enforce the Community Reinvestment Act, the nation's major
anti-redlining law. Under pressure by the banking industry, both the
White House and Congress looked the other way while America's banks
redlined cities, denying loans to home buyers and small business entre-
preneurs, while (thanks to deregulation) engaging in an orgy of specula-
tion that led to the savings and loan crisis.75
Studies of local mortgage lending during the past decade have
shown consistently that banks provide fewer loans to minority neighbor-
hoods than to white neighborhoods with comparable socio-economic
characteristics. 76 This helps account for the low level of homeownership
72. MARKUSEN & YUDKEN, supra note 69, at 173.
73. For example, in September 1992, President Bush, far behind Governor Clinton in the
Missouri polls, traveled to St. Louis to announce the sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 jet fighters,
which are manufactured by McDonnell-Douglas, the state's largest employer. The sale was
highly questionable on defense and foreign policy grounds, but Bush made little pretense of
discussing geopolitics. He emphasized the 7000 local jobs generated by the weapon.
74. Paulette Thomas, Small Businesses, Key to Urban Recovery, Are Starved for Capital,
WALL ST. J., June 11, 1992, at Al.
75. Peter Dreier, Redlining Cities: How Banks Color Community Development, 34 CHAL-
LENGE, Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 15, 17-19; see FROM REDLINING TO REINVESTMENT: COMMU-
NITY RESPONSES TO URBAN DISINVESTMENT (Gregory D. Squires ed., 1992).
76. See CHARLES FINN, MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON'S NEIGHBORHOODS 1981-87
(1990); Ann B. Shlay, Financing Community: Methods for Assessing Residential Credit Dispari-
ties, Market Barriers and Institutional Reinvestment Performance in the Metropolis, 11 J. URB.
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in minority neighborhoods. Residential redlining is compounded by
commercial redlining, making it even more difficult for small businesses
to open or expand in inner city areas.77 For example, Los Angles County
had 1068 supermarkets in 1970, but only 694 in 1990; most of the
boarded-up markets are in the city's minority areas. There is one super-
market for every 40,646 residents in South Central Los Angeles, com-
pared with one supermarket for every 23,224 residents in the county.78
Prior to 1991, mortgage lending studies looked at disparities by geo-
graphic areas. Recent improvements in the federal Home Mortgage Dis-
closure Act, brought about through pressure from community activists,
allowed researchers to look at disparities in mortgage loans to individuals
by race, income, and gender. Using 1990 and 1991 data, the Federal
Reserve Board looked at the rates at which banks accept and reject mort-
gage applications from white, black, and Hispanic consumers. The first
study examined 5.26 million home loan applications made in 1990 na-
tionwide, and also looked at the data for nineteen metropolitan areas.
The study found that banks rejected blacks and Hispanics for home
mortgages more than twice as often as whites with similar incomes. The
second study, conducted a year later, found the disparities remained the
same.
79
In October 1992, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston published the
most conclusive study to date demonstrating lending discrimination. It
looked at the credit-worthiness of applicants in the Boston area to deter-
mine whether differences in rejection rates could be caused by differences
in wealth, employment and credit histories, debt burdens, or other fac-
tors. It found substantial disparities between white and minority appli-
cants, even taking into account these factors.80
The absence of banks in inner city neighborhoods compounds the
problem of bank redlining. During the past few decades, banks have dis-
invested physically as well as economically from America's cities. For
example, the riot-tom areas of Los Angeles, home to more than 500,000
AFF. 201 (1989); Bill Dedman, The Color of Money, ATLANTA J. & CONsT., May 1-4, 1988, at
Al (series of articles).
77. Thomas, supra note 74, at Al.
78. Richard W. Stevenson, Riots Inflamed a Festering South-Central Economy, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 6, 1992, at A23. Supermarkets have fled inner cities across the country. See
Turque et al., supra note 59, at 36.
79. Glenn B. Canner & Dolores Smith, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Expanded Data
on Residential Lending (1991); Mitchell Zuckoff, Study: Denial Rate on Loans Still High for
Minorities, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 28, 1992, at 43.
80. ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON: INTERPRETING
HMDA DATA (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper No. 92-7, 1992).
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residents, have only nineteen bank branches."1 Economic factors ac-
count for much of this segregation, but not all of it. Because minorities
are poorer than white Americans, they have fewer options in terms of
renting or owning a home. Even those minority residents with the finan-
cial resources to provide such options, however, are often victims of dis-
crimination by realtors and lenders. Recent studies by the Urban
Institute and the Federal Reserve Bank document that blacks experience
discrimination, regardless of income. Banks continue to redline minority
neighborhoods and deny loans to black consumers at a rate much higher
than for whites with similar incomes. Realtors continue to steer black
families looking to rent an apartment or buy a home into segregated
areas.
82
Redlining by insurance companies, in terms of both residential and
commercial policies, also exacerbates the problem of urban disinvest-
ment. As the New York Times noted: "A lack of property insurance can
strangle a neighborhood's economy. Banks usually refuse to give mort-
gages on uninsured property, and small businesses find it next to impossi-
ble to lease equipment or order goods on consignment if they are
unprotected against fire, theft or civil disturbances. 83
Insurance company policies-such as minimum policy requirements
for homeowner or retail insurance-discriminate against cities and, in
particular, minority areas. In addition, the location of insurance agents'
offices (disproportionately in suburban areas), and the absence of agents
who live in or are familiar with urban neighbors, create a discriminatory
effect.84
E. Federal Cutbacks
As noted above, federal government policies have encouraged, even
subsidized, the flight of businesses, jobs, and people from America's cit-
ies. Then, to rub salt in these wounds, the federal government during the
81. Bill Montague, Study: Many L.A. Lenders Fail Minorities, USA TODAY, May 12,
1992, at B1; see James Bates, Large Banks Pressed to Hasten Rebuilding with Flow of Credit,
L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1992, at B3.
82. For detailed discussion, see MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., HOUSING DISCRIMI-
NATION STUDY: ANALYZING RACIAL AND ETHNIC STEERING passim (1991); MARGERY
AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., HOUSING DISCRIMINATION STUDY: SYNTHESIS 25-33 (1991); Mar-
gery Austin Turner, Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets: Lessons from Fair Housing
Audits, 3 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 185, 185-215 (1992).
83. Peter Kerr, Riots Raise Concerns About Insurance Redlining, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
1992, at D2.
84. Gregory D. Squires et al., Insurance Redlining, Agency Location, and the Process of
Urban Disinvestment, 26 URB. AFF. Q. 567, 567-88 (1991); see Junda Woo, Insurers May Not
"Redline"Appeals Court Says, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1992, at B14.
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Reagan and Bush administrations slashed federal aid to cities, reversing
five decades of steady growth in federal urban assistance.
The government cut three kinds of programs-direct grants to local
governments, loans and grants to private and nonprofit groups for eco-
nomic development and housing, and programs to help individuals cope
with (or lift themselves out of) poverty. In addition, the federal govern-
ment (and some states) imposed a large number of mandates on cities,
costing these cities billions of dollars without providing additional funds,
further exacerbating local fiscal crises.85
By withdrawing federal funds and increasing federal mandates,
Washington was telling local governments to do more with less. Unfor-
tunately, despite popular notions of local government corruption and
mismanagement, there was little fat to trim. Washington's "fend-for-
yourself federalism" simply meant that financially strapped localities had
to cut programs and services during a time of growing needs.86
The combined impact of these cuts and mandates has been devastat-
ing to local governments' ability to deliver services and to urban resi-
dents' capacity to cope with poverty and the various health, housing, and
other problems associated with poverty. Because the number of poor
Americans grew significantly during the past decade, while concentration
of the poor in cities increased, cities experienced the most serious reper-
cussions from the cutbacks in programs designed to serve individuals.
The recession, which began in 1989, exacerbated the local fiscal crisis by
undermining the capacity of local governments to raise revenues from
property taxes.
During his administration, President Reagan completely eliminated
general revenue sharing, which in 1980 had provided $10.8 billion in di-
rect funds to local governments ($1.75 billion to cities with a population
of over 300,000).17 In 1980, federal dollars accounted for 14.3% of city
budgets. In 1992, it is less than 5%. During the 1980s, some state gov-
ernments provided funding to fill at least part of that gap, but in the late
1980s states began cutting local aid to the bone.8 8 According to one ex-
85. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, FEDERAL STATU-
TORY PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITY 37 (1992); JANET KELLY, STATE
MANDATES (1992); Joseph F. Zimmermann, Regulating Intergovernmental Relations in the
1990s, THE ANNALS, May 1990, at 48-59; Joseph F. Zimmermann, Federal Induced State and
Local Government Costs (paper delivered at the American Political Science Association meet-
ings, Washington, D.C., Sept. 1991).
86. See Richard Hill, Federalism and Urban Policy: The Intergovernmental Dialectic, in
THE CHANGING FACE OF FISCAL FEDERALISM 35, 35-55 (Thomas R. Swartz & John E. Peck
eds., 1990).
87. Demetrios Caraley, Washington Abandons the Cities, 107 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 1-30 (1992).
88. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: CHANGING PATTERNS IN STATE-LoCAL FI-
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pert, "if New York City had held on to the same percentage of its general
expenditures funded by federal and state aid in 1989 as in 1980, it would
have had some $4 billion more to spend and not had a budget crisis in
1990 and 1991, when it was forced to cut services and raise local
taxes." 8 9 From the states' perspective, Medicaid was by far the biggest
budget-buster. Because states were required to allocate more of their
own revenues to match federal dollars, they had less available to help
cities.
Washington also slashed successful urban programs such as public
works, economic development, job training, and transit by more than
70%. The federal government reduced funding for public service jobs
(CETA) and job training from $9.8 billion in 1980 to $3 billion in 1990.
Community development block grants (CDBG) were cut from $6.2 bil-
lion to $2.8 billion. Local public works grants, which totalled $660 mil-
lion in 1980, were eliminated entirely.
Federal housing assistance to the poor, budgeted at approximately
$30 billion in 1980, also fell prey to Congress's sweeping budget cuts,
suffering a reduction of over 70%. During the late 1970s, for example,
the federal government added over 300,000 new subsidized housing units
a year. By the end of the 1980s, that number was under 30,000. These
cuts parallel a dramatic rise in homelessness and a deepening housing
crisis among poor and working class Americans.
Programs targeted primarily to individuals-Medicaid, welfare
(AFDC), food stamps, child nutrition, WIC, and housing vouchers-
either increased slightly or remained about the same. The overall budget
levels are misleading, however, because during the 1980s the number of
poor people eligible for such programs increased significantly. As a re-
sult, fewer individuals actually received assistance; those who did re-
ceived smaller benefits. For example, AFDC payments and food stamps
benefits did not keep pace with inflation; as a result, families receiving
AFDC were worse off at the end of the decade than they were before.
Between 1980 and 1990, the average AFDC benefit dropped from $3506
to $3218 per family in 1990 constant dollars. Similarly, during the reces-
sion that began in 1989, a growing number of unemployed Americans
were cut off from receiving unemployment benefits because the time limit
for eligibility had expired.
As local governments "downsize" their operations, the poor and
NANCES (1992); Michael deCourcey Hinds, States' Strained Finances Reveal Recession's Toll,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, 1992, at B6; Michael deCourcey Hinds, 80's Legacy: States and Cities in
Need, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1990, at Al.
89. Caral~y, supra note 87, at 9.
1993] 1385
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
working-class residents of America's cities are pitted against each other
for these shrinking resources. This leads to heightened social and racial
tensions. It also makes it more and more difficult for local officials to
govern effectively.
V. POLICY SOLUTIONS
Cities on their own cannot solve the problems of poverty or of urban
decay. Cities are trapped by boundaries that will not expand and are
subject to a national-and increasingly global-economy over which
they have no control. For most of the period since World War II, and
increasingly over the past twelve years, federal policies have contributed
to the decline of the cities. It will require federal policies-with the help
of state and local governments and community organizations-to bring
cities back.
Thirty years ago, Americans were confident that they could eradi-
cate poverty and urban decay. Unfortunately, many of the programs
designed to achieve these goals proved unsuccessful. Many of today's
opinion-makers have learned the wrong lessons from the inadequate
stop-and-go efforts of the past three decades. They argue that the gov-
ernment has tried and failed. This argument is unpersuasive, however,
because most of these efforts were underfunded, misguided, and sought
to serve too many goals. The "war on poverty," for example, was never
really given a chance. Still, some of the programs that emerged from
that period have demonstrated success, despite limited funding and com-
mitment.90 The magnitude of America's economic problems and its ur-
ban ills have grown, requiring new ideas and new approaches.
Nonetheless, the view promoted by right-wing think tanks and pundits
during the Reagan/Bush years-and accepted in part by many others-
that the federal government can play no constructive role, or that "noth-
ing can be done" because the problems are so infractible, contradicts
much evidence and experience.
The key to revitalizing America's cities is to close the investment gap
that lies at the root of America's economic troubles and competitive de-
cline. There are three major components to a federal investment strategy
to revitalize cities: First, the government must stimulate national eco-
nomic growth and create jobs (with the goal of a full-employment econ-
omy), focusing major investment in the nation's physical infrastructure.
Second, it must improve the nation's human infrastructure and the pro-
ductivity of its current and future workforce. Third, it must invest in
90. JOHN E. SCHWARZ, AMERICA'S HIDDEN SUCCESS: A REASSESSMENT OF TWENTY
YEARS OF PUBLIC POLICY 31-45 (1983).
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urban neighborhoods to improve the economic, physical, and social con-
ditions of these communities.
While the first two components are not place-specific-not targeted
directly to cities-they will have a disproportionate impact on cities, be-
cause the nation's crumbling infrastructure, underutilized workforce,
and most troubled populations are concentrated there. At the same time,
federal policymakers must recognize that rebuilding urban neighbor-
hoods requires direct investment to compensate for decades of
disinvestment.
Without getting lost in details, it is possible to outline the broad
principles and key elements of each investment strategy.
A. Jobs and Economic Growth
Most economists agree that investing in a jobs-creating program to
rebuild the nation's crumbling infrastructure, including public transpor-
tation (highways, bridges, aviation facilities), water, waste disposal, and
sewer systems, is the most efficient way both to jump-start the economy
and promote long-term growth.9 1 The United States, having fallen far
behind Japan and Europe in investing in its infrastructure, does not have
a first-class mass transit system; plans to build a high-speed rail in the
Boston-Washington corridor are still in the discussion stage.92
In early 1992 the USCM released a report, Ready to Go, identifying
over 7200 public works projects currently on hold across the country
because cities lack the funds to implement them. Once started, these
projects would create 418,400 construction jobs and, calculating the mul-
tiplier effects of such investment, over one million jobs within a year.
State and local governments own the bulk of the nation's public in-
frastructure-38% in the form of highways and streets, 16% as water
and sewer systems, and 30% as schools, hospitals, and other buildings.
Improvement in public infrastructure generates substantial returns to the
private economy, including dramatic increases in GNP and productivity.
Moreover, infrastructure located in cities provides substantial benefits
throughout the entire metropolitan region. From a cost-benefit perspec-
tive, repairing and extending the existing infrastructure yields greater re-
turns than building new facilities in outlying areas.93
Beyond infrastructure, there is a rationale for a broader public jobs
initiative, targeted not only to public works, but also to public service.
91. See, eg., ASCHAUER, supra note 48.
92. See Peter H. Stone, The Faster Track" Should We Build a High-Speed Rail System?,
AM. PROSPECT, Fall 1992, at 99, 104.
93. PERSKY et al., supra note 28.
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Since the New Deal (with its Works Progress Administration, National
Youth Administration, and Civilian Conservation Corps programs),
other administrations have used public jobs creation as a countercyclical
tool to combat the high unemployment accompanying a recessionary
economy, although subsequent efforts paled in scope to the New Deal
program. But even in healthy economic times, some areas of the country
and some sectors of the population (especially young people) suffer from
high unemployment.
Opponents criticize such efforts as "make-work" jobs, but such an
initiative can serve several goals: reducing unemployment, replacing wel-
fare with work (thus reducing unemployment insurance and welfare ex-
penditures, while turning underutilized workers into tax-paying
workers), and providing needed services. Some recent proposals include
a public jobs program as a major component of any comprehensive wel-
fare reform. For example, Senator David Boren (D-Okla.) has proposed
a Community Works Program Administration designed to create jobs for
the unemployed and welfare recipients; a number of model work pro-
grams for youth, such as Public/Private Ventures in Pennsylvania and
Youth Build (based in Boston, with affiliates in seven other cities), have
shown success. 9
4
Although major investment in public infrastructure is a valuable
first step toward sustained economic growth and job creation, additional
steps are required. New sources of capital (particularly pension funds)
must be tapped; research and development priorities must be changed to
improve the productivity of the civilian economy, particularly in new
growth sectors (such as telecommunications); trade, tax, and bank re-
form policies must encourage private enterprises to invest in productive
jobs (as opposed to speculation and mergers) and to remain in the United
States.
In the past, getting a job was the solution to poverty. But today, at
least one-fifth of all full-time workers receive poverty-level wages. If the
poverty standard is updated, as many as 30 million Americans may be
counted among the "working poor."9" Expanding the earned-income tax
credit, or increasing the minimum wage (which has fallen far behind in-
94. Much of this material on job initiatives was drawn from SAR A. LEVITAN & FRANK
GALLO, SPENDING TO SAVE: EXPANDING EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES (1991); Peter T.
Kilborn, For the Urban Young, Carpentry Skills and Hope, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1992, at Al;
and Alan Murray, New Deal's WPA and CCC Enjoy Renewed Vogue As Washington Tackles
Poverty and Urban Decay, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1992, at A14.
95. John E. Schwarz & Thomas J Volgy, Social Support for Self-Reliance, AM. PROSPECT,
Spring 1992, at 67, 69. Schwarz and Volgy present their work in detail in their new book,
JOHN E. SCHWARZ & THOMAS J. VOLGY, THE FORGOTrEN AMERICANS (1992).
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flation in the past twelve years), would address this concern. Equally
important, changes in the nation's unfair labor-management laws, which
currently impede union organizing efforts, would help increase wages
and benefits among poverty-level workers, particularly in the service- and
light-manufacturing sectors.
Finally, a plan for economic renewal must confront the question of
economic conversion. The end of the Cold War provides both an oppor-
tunity for and an obstacle to revitalizing America's cities. Current Pen-
tagon spending levels can be cut by one-third to one-half over the next
five years without endangering national security. These funds-over
$150 billion a year-could be directed both to deficit reduction and to
new priorities, including cities.
Congressional debates on closing military facilities or cutting weap-
ons systems no longer revolve primarily around national security con-
cerns, but around the short-term adverse effects these cuts have on
communities, workers, and firms that rely on military spending. The
failure of Congress in early 1992 to enact legislation to tear down the
budget wall between military and domestic spending reflected this basic
dilemma: Even those lawmakers who favor cutting defense spending do
not want cuts that will hurt workers, firms, and communities in their
home districts. It is unreasonable to expect communities and companies
to deal with their economic pain alone, but that is basically what is tak-
ing place. Although many in Congress have proposed comprehensive
conversion bills, they have gone nowhere. Despite Congress's having ap-
propriated the small sum of $200 million for military "adjustment" in
1990, only half of the dollars were spent by the Department of Defense
by 1992.
America now needs a conversion plan to shift resources into im-
proving the civilian economy and meeting social needs, including the im-
provement of the nation's cities. Such a plan would involve allocating
funds for retooling plants and retraining workers, as well as providing
income maintenance and job relocation benefits and small business assist-
ance to help subcontractors and supplier firms. The plan should also
help local communities adjust to military base closures and major reduc-
tions at defense contracting firms and to change R&D priorities.
There is already considerable debate concerning how to carry out a
post-Cold War conversion strategy that will minimize short-term pain
and maximize the long-term benefits to the nation's economy. 96 An ef-
96. See MARKUSEN & YUDKEN, supra note 69; MARION ANDERSON ET AL., CON-
VERTING THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AN ALTERNATIVE SE-
CURITY POLICY (1991); MARION ANDERSON, A SHIFT IN MILITARY SPENDING TO
19931 1389
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
fective conversion plan by necessity involves elements of national plan-
ning and industrial strategy, but it must also incorporate local
communities and businesses planning efforts. A federal agency to coordi-
nate conversion planning should be located outside the Pentagon. This
agency could coordinate a series of task forces and advisory committees,
involving representatives of all parties with a stake in the peace dividend,
including urban mayors and community leaders, to advise the President
and Congress on a conversion plan.
B. The Workforce: Today and Tomorrow
There is growing recognition that America has fallen far behind its
competitors in investing in "human capital"-its current and future
workforce. A growing voice within American business is now joining
more traditional liberal sectors in calling for expanding the nation's so-
cial programs. Both Fortune and Business Week featured post-riot arti-
cles calling for a major national investment in human capital-such as
job training, health care, child care, and education (from Head Start
through post-high school)-to improve the productivity of the
workforce.97 These business publications recognize that the social and
economic costs of unemployment, welfare, and an unprepared workforce
are a drain on America's competitiveness in the world economy. Presi-
dent Clinton echoed this view during his presidential campaign, con-
stantly repeating the refrain: "We cannot afford to waste anyone."
Economists argue that the United States cannot (and should not)
compete with Third World nations to attract low-skill, low-wage jobs.
The future of the American economy, they suggest, lies in attracting
high-wage, high-skill, high-productivity jobs. Thus, attention must focus
on preparing the workforce for the twenty-first century economy. 98
While there is some debate over this formulation-some economists ar-
gue that preparing the workforce will not guarantee that good jobs will
be created; others observe that the more immediate problem is finding
jobs for today's low-skilled youth-there is no controversy over the need
to invest more in America's youth and its workforce.
Although the competency skills of American youth in reading,
math, and science have improved steadily, they still lag far behind that of
AMERICA'S CITIES (1988); BETTY G. LALL & JOHN T. MARLIN, BUILDING A PEACE ECON-
OMY: OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS OF POST-COLD WAR DEFENSE CUTS (1992); Ann
Markusen, Dismantling the Cold War Economy, WORLD POL. J., Summer 1992, at 389-99.
97. See The Economic Crisis of Urban America, Bus. WK., May 18, 1992, at 38; What We
Can Do Now, FORTUNE, June 1, 1992, at 40, 41-48.
98. See ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS (1991); Robert B. Reich, The Real
Economy, ATLANTIC, Feb. 1991, at 35, 35-52.
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their counterparts in Europe and Japan. The overall high school gradua-
tion rate, as well as the rate among inner-city youth, has increased stead-
ily. A high school diploma alone, however, does not guarantee that
students have the required learning skills or competencies to succeed in
the labor market. Among high school drop-outs, the problem of inability
to compete is even worse.
New and expanded initiatives in education and training are needed.
Some successful programs during the past decade suggest how this goal
can be accomplished. 9 Preschool programs, such as Head Start, have
demonstrated substantial success for disadvantaged youth; participants
perform better in school and are more likely to graduate high school.
But Head Start, funded at $2.2 billion in 1992, currently reaches only
one-fourth of the 2.5 million eligible children; a fully-funded program
would cost $7.7 billion by 1994.
Even the benefits of preschooling are sometimes undermined by stu-
dents' school experiences and the other obstacles confronting inner-city
youth. Most inner-city schools do not work for their students or the
larger society. A school reform program should include the following
key elements: Changes in school governance (such as school-based man-
agement) and school funding (to narrow disparities between poor and
wealthy localities); more parental involvement in active learning (includ-
ing programs that teach parents to help teach their children); growing
use of magnet schools; stronger integration between schools and after-
school programs (such as recreation) and community health programs;
changes in teacher training and retraining (to emphasize child develop-
ment as well as pedagogy); changes in expectations toward student per-
formance; and curriculum revisions to address the experiences of inner-
city students (including immigrant children).
Successful programs-such as those run by James Comer in New
Haven and Deborah Meier in New York City-demonstrate that inner-
city schools can be turned around. There is growing recognition, how-
ever, that mainstream schools cannot work for all students. At-risk
youth-particularly adolescents and young teens from inner-city neigh-
borhoods-need special help addressing questions of self-esteem and
making positive "life-choices" in order to avoid falling into the subcul-
99. Some of the ideas in this discussion draw on THE URBAN INST., CONFRONTING THE
NATION'S URBAN CRISIS (1992) [hereinafter CONFRONTING THE NATION'S URBAN CRISIS];
BILLY J. TIDWELL, PLAYING TO WIN: A MARSHALL PLAN FOR AMERICA (1991); THE COM-
MON GOOD: SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE (1989); Albert R. Karr, Job
Corps, Long Considered a Success, Gets Entangled in Political Tug-of-War, WALL ST. J., June
1, 1992, at A14; and the final report of the National Commission on Children and several
reports by the Children's Defense Fund.
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ture of gangs, drugs, teenage parenthood, and consequent poor school
performance. A number of successful programs run primarily by com-
munity agencies-involving mentoring, streetworkers, community ser-
vice (such as Boston's City Year program) and school-work linkages-
have demonstrated some success. More intensive programs-such as ur-
ban prep schools-also have shown positive results.
The United States also must revise dramatically the way it prepares
youth, particularly urban youth, for the job market. The current major
job-training program, the Job Training Partnership Act (JPTA), has not
demonstrated much success. Mainstream vocational education programs
are not tied to the labor market, especially for noncollege bound youth.
Either they train youth for jobs that no longer exist or for dead-end jobs
with no potential for mobility. A growing number of companies support
inner-city high school apprenticeship programs, but these ad hoc efforts
do not add up to a comprehensive approach. America's European com-
petitors place greater emphasis on ongoing training and retraining of
noncollege students and adults. School-to-work transition programs
must involve public schools, community colleges, and vocational/techni-
cal schools. The United States needs greater cooperation between educa-
tional institutions and private employers, more private sector
involvement for worker education and training, training programs that
focus on ready-to-work skills and that anticipate changes in the job mar-
ket, and clearer performance standards, including a comprehensive sys-
tem of certification for technical and professional skills.
More intensive residential "youth center" programs, such as the Job
Corps and Youth Build, are needed to provide at-risk youth with an al-
ternative to the regular school system. The Jobs Corps program (annual
cost: $20,000 per participant) has proven very effective, particularly for
at-risk youth, but there are long waiting lists. According to one study,
every $1 spent on the Job Corps returns $1.46 in higher taxes and lower
welfare, crime, and prison costs. Job Corps graduates have more em-
ployment and higher pay than similar youths who do not participate. 1°°
In the Jobs Corps' immersion approach, young people, especially high
school drop-outs, move out of their neighborhoods into special Job Corps
centers for an average of eight months, where they learn the discipline of
high-performance work, along with special skills instruction and ready-
to-work socialization. The Job Corps, which now serves only 60,000
youth a year with a $920 million budget, should be dramatically ex-
panded as part of a nationwide effort to provide at-risk youths with the
100. CONFRONTING THE NATION'S URBAN CRISIS, supra note 99, at 12; Karr, supra note
99, at A14.
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necessary job skills. A similar program, called Youth Build (financed by
several major foundations), has been successful in several cities, not only
by providing inner-city young people (ages seventeen to twenty-five,
mostly high school drop-outs) with job skills, but also by addressing is-
sues of self-esteem and social skills. Several members of Congress have
proposed a small federally funded demonstration program based on
Youth Build's success.101
Education and training efforts alone will not make America's
workforce competitive in the world economy if the population's physical,
social, and mental health remain in trouble. Investment in human capi-
tal also must involve a national health insurance plan and adequate child
care allowances to allow parents real choices about entering the labor
force. School breakfast and lunch programs and expanded public health
efforts through neighborhood-based community health centers (including
immunization for all children) cost relatively little, but have large pay-
offs.
C. Rebuilding Urban Neighborhoods
National policies that promote economic growth and that invest in
people are necessary, but not sufficient, to improve America's cities and
its most troubled neighborhoods. Just as a rising tide does not lift all
boats, neither does a rising economy lift all troubled low-income neigh-
borhoods, nor does it prevent stable neighborhoods from declining.
In the past, federal policies have done more to hurt urban neighbor-
hoods than help them, mostly by subsidizing the exodus of people and
jobs. Even many policies specifically created to upgrade inner-city neigh-
borhoods have had mixed results, in part because they were not well
designed to achieve specific ends. For example, rebuilding cities requires
more than changing a neighborhood's physical conditions-the mistake
made by the urban renewal programs of the past. 102 It involves knitting
together the economic and social fabric of urban neighborhoods. People
live in houses or apartments, but they also live in communities, which
provide the economic and social supports that foster individual and fam-
ily well-being and mitigate against anti-social behavior. People-oriented
policies that help individuals lift themselves "up" may also give those
individuals opportunities to move "out." Thus, place-specific policies
designed to improve low-income neighborhoods require a careful bal-
101. Kilborn, supra note 94, at Al.
102. See, eg., Marshall Kaplan, American Neighborhood Policies: Mixed Results and Une-
ven Evaluations, in THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL URBAN POLICY 210, 210-24 (Marshall
Kaplan & Franklin James eds., 1990).
1993] 1393
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ance: The programs must assist residents in upgrading physical, eco-
nomic, and social conditions that make urban neighborhoods attractive
to people with many choices, but without displacing or harming the peo-
ple with few choices.
In the past decade, we have learned a great deal about what works
and what does not work. Turning these neighborhoods around requires
policies that are place-specific. This includes several elements, discussed
in turn below: providing jobs for neighborhood residents; creating a vital
neighborhood business district with adequate retail services; creating de-
cent affordable housing, especially homeownership, for residents; pro-
moting public safety so that residents, entrepreneurs, and others feel free
from crime and disorder; and fostering strong community institutions
through which residents participate in improving their own
neighborhoods.
Jobs for neighborhood residents. To bring jobs to inner city neigh-
borhoods, conservative policy analysts and former HUD Secretary Jack
Kemp have suggested some version of enterprise zones. These are essen-
tially bribes (tax breaks and exemptions from regulations) to businesses
to invest in urban neighborhoods troubled by high rates of poverty and
unemployment. Experience so far suggests, however, that these zones
simply intensify the bidding wars that already pit cities against each
other to attract investment. Many studies also show that most businesses
view tax incentives as only a marginal factor in deciding where to locate
plants and offices. According to Business Week, "a General Accounting
Office study found that infrastructure, low crime rates, and access to la-
bor markets were more important factors in site selection than tax
rates."1
03
Thirty-seven states have sponsored more than 500 enterprise zones.
This experience suggests that most of the jobs and businesses will be im-
ported from another city or nearby neighborhood not quite devastated
enough to fit the enterprise zone criteria. This zero-sum game-robbing
St. Petersburg to pay St. Paul-offers no new jobs and does not reduce
the overall unemployment rate. Moreover, the program offers no guar-
antee that the jobs will pay decent wages or go to inner-city residents.
An effective enterprise zone program should provide businesses with
incentives only if they create new jobs in the inner cities and hire inner-
103. Situation CriticalBut Not Helpless, Bus. WK., May 18, 1992, at 44, 45. For reviews of
the experience with enterprize zones, see Robert Guskind, Enterprise Zones: Do They Work?,
J. HOUSING, Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 47; Rochelle Stanfield, Battle Zones, 24 NAT'L J. 1348, 1348-52
(1992); Jill Zuckman, AllAbout Enterprise Zones, AM. CAUCUS, Aug. 31-Sept. 13, 1992, at 1;
Tom Furlong, Enterprise Zone in L.A. Fraught with Problems, L.A. TIMEs, May 19, 1992, at
DI.
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city residents for those jobs. Employers must also receive assistance for
job-related training. In contrast, "programs that offer capital gains tax
breaks dissipate their benefits. Owners tend to invest in capital rather
than jobs, and shy away from the risks of local labor." '
In recent decades, inner-city job creation has proved most successful
when linked with local entrepreneurs, including community-based non-
profit economic development organizations (typically called community
development corporations or CDCs). 05 The problem is that for decades,
urban entrepreneurs have been swimming against the tide, facing unwill-
ing lenders, few equity sources, and poor infrastructure, and having ac-
cess to little of the technical expertise that large firms buy with ease.
Without adequate access to capital, both debt and equity, adequate infra-
structure and municipal services, and technical expertise, urban neigh-
borhood businesses will remain small, struggling ventures.
The lessons of the success stories in neighborhood economic devel-
opment are clear. Federal programs must provide seed capital, equity,
and loans to community-based groups and small for-profit entrepreneurs
to support neighborhood-based job creation projects. Senator Edward
Kennedy recently proposed a National Community Economic Partner-
ship Act along these lines. The federal government could also assist
start-up entrepreneurs by establishing small business development cen-
ters, modeled on several successful existing programs, to help provide
basic capacities (auditing services, automated inventory control, business
planning, accounting control systems). Federal policies can also target
specific fiscal assistance to local governments specifically for improving
infrastructure and municipal services to inner-city business districts.
Many inner-city residents, however, are not likely to work in the
neighborhoods where they live. In addition to people-oriented programs
that provide residents with job skills, policies are needed also to over-
come barriers to employment discrimination by race and to provide
transportation to downtown and suburban employment. In one inner-
city neighborhood in Chicago, for example, only 18% of residents had
access to a car. Where public transportation from inner-city neighbor-
hoods to these jobs exists at all, it often involves lengthy commutes and
transfers. William J. Wilson has recommended that the federal govern-
ment create both job-information centers to help residents find jobs, and
104. CONFRONTING THE NATION'S URBAN CRISIS, supra note 99, at 17.
105. See NEAL R. PIERCE & CAROL F. STEINBACH, ENTERPRISING COMMUNITIES: COM-
MUNITY-BASED DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICA (1990); Patrick Barry, RXfor Sick Cities, 15
THE NEIGHBORHOOD WORKS, Aug.-Sept. 1992, at 16, 16-23.
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car-pooling systems necessary to get to them.10 6
Creating vital neighborhood business districts. Strong neighborhoods
provide most of the services that residents need on a day-to-day basis.
Grocery stores, bank branches, clothing stores, pharmacies, and other
retail services are critical. Not only are these services convenient for
shoppers, but their presence guarantees that residents will meet in the
course of their daily routines, reinforcing a sense of community. Such
businesses also provide jobs and opportunities for entrepreneurship
among local residents.
Many of the same policy tools described in the preceding section
have been used to revitalize neighborhood business districts. CDCs and
small entrepreneurs have played a major role in these efforts. 107 In addi-
tion, policies that encourage private capital and credit toward these geo-
graphic areas are essential. Despite lack of enforcement by federal
regulators, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) has been a success-
ful tool used by local governments and community organizations to at-
tract bank financing, primarily for housing development and homeowner
mortgages, and to pressure banks to open branches in inner cities.108
Commercial loans are as important to neighborhood strength as home
mortgages. Congress should expand the CRA to incorporate commercial
loans as part of the regulators' evaluation of banks' lending perform-
ances. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) should also add
commercial loans to the data required on all bank reports, which identify
where, and to whom, banks have made loans. Further, insurance compa-
nies should be added within the CRA's jurisdiction, given the important
role that insurance plays in the success or failure of neighborhood busi-
ness districts.
Affordable housing.1 09 In the past, the federal government has de-
pended primarily on market forces to provide housing to the poor-a
strategy that has not worked. As noted above, only 29% of low-income
households receive federal housing assistance: 1.36 million live in public
housing, 1.65 million live in federally subsidized but privately owned de-
velopments, and 1.06 million receive rent certificates to help them find
106. Timothy Noah & David Wessel, Urban Solutions: Inner City Remedies Offer Novel
Plans-And Hope, Experts Say, WALL ST. J., May 4, 1992, at Al.
107. See PIERCE & STEINBACH, supra note 105; Barry, supra note 105, at 18-23.
108. Dreier, supra note 75, at 15-23.
109. This section draws on Peter Dreier & John Atlas, Housing and Urban Development, in
CHANGING AMERICA: BLUEPRINTS FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION (Mark Green ed.,
1992).
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housing in the private marketplace."1 Rebuilding inner-city neighbor-
hoods requires a variety of tested strategies. First, substandard housing
must be upgraded, while new housing must be built to fill in the vacant
lots that scar inner-city neighborhoods. The major delivery system for
carrying out this objective should be community-based housing develop-
ment groups. Perhaps the silver lining in the dark cloud of the past dec-
ade's housing crisis has been the emergence of thousands of grassroots,
neighborhood-based, nonprofit housing development organizations in in-
ner cities across the nation."' Such organizations have patched together
resources from local and state governments, foundations, corporations,
churches, and other sources to build and rehabilitate housing against
enormous odds. Through these increasingly sophisticated efforts, they
have been able to leverage significant public and private investment in
inner-city neighborhoods. In 1990, Congress passed a small program to
encourage the expansion of the nonprofit housing sector; it required cities
to set aside at least 15% of the $1.5 billion HOME (housing block grant)
program to fund community-based nonprofit groups. To realize the full
potential of this sector, comparable to the successful "third sector" hous-
ing program in Canada, this small program should be expanded. More-
over, as in Canada, federally assisted housing should promote economic
and social diversity by encouraging mixed-income developments, rather
than ghettoizing the poor." 2 Single-family homeownership (such as
New York's church-sponsored Nehemiah program, which builds low-
cost homes and provides low-interest mortgages to low-income families)
and limited equity cooperative housing developments sponsored by non-
profit agencies are preferable to rental projects. The federal government
should also provide special mortgage subsidies to encourage working-
class families to purchase and fix up homes in inner-city neighbor-
hoods-a reversal of postwar subsidies that encouraged the middle class
to move out of cities.
Second, the government should improve the nation's existing public
110. CONNIE CASEY, CHARACTERISTICS OF Hu-ASSISTED RENTERS AND THEIR UNITS
IN 1989, at 4 (1992).
111. PIERCE & STEINBACH, supra note 105; NEAL R. PIERCE & CAROL F. STEINBACH,
CORRECTIVE CAPITALISM: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPO-
RATIONS (1987); Avis VIDAL, REBUILDING COMMUNITIES: A NATIONAL STUDY OF URBAN
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS (1992); CHANGING THE ODDS: THE ACHIEVE-
MENTS OF COMMUNITY-BASED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS (1991); COMMUNITY-BASED
DEVELOPMENT: INVESTING IN RENEWAL, EXPANDING HORIZONS: A RESEARCH REPORT
ON CORPORATE AND FOUNDATION GRANT SUPPORT OF COMMUNITY-BASED DEVELOP-
MENT (1991); Alex Kotlowitz, Community Groups Quietly Make Strides in Inner-City Hous-
ing, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1992, at Al.
112. Peter Dreier & J. David Hulchanski, Affordable Housing: Lessons from Canada, AM.
PROSPECT, Spring 1990, at 119, 119-25.
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housing and federally assisted privately owned developments. This in-
volves giving residents a strong voice in management and, where tenants
seek to do so, ownership. This should occur, however, only with ade-
quate physical rehabilitation and ongoing financial assistance to avoid
future foreclosures and physical decay. Megablock projects should be
reconfigured physically to integrate them into surrounding neighbor-
hoods, such as the successful efforts in Boston's Commonwealth and Al-
ice Taylor projects. HUD should give residents a strong voice in
reforming tenant selection and eviction policies; for example, tenants
who "make it" should not be evicted, but allowed to remain, to provide
role models and contacts for job opportunities. Eviction policies should
make it easier to rid developments of tenants engaged in criminal activi-
ties, including drug dealing and use. Finally, residents of subsidized de-
velopments should be linked to on-site community support services (job
training, child care, health care, substance abuse programs), such as the
successful Family Development Center at Baltimore's Lafayette Court
housing project. 113
Third, HUD should provide all eligible low-income households with
rental vouchers, but require that the program be metropolitan-wide, so
that residents can have greater choice and have opportunities to live
outside inner cities. Chicago's successful Gautreaux Program, which
provides housing counseling to low-income participants, should be repli-
cated nationwide. Started in the 1970s, the program has allocated over
3800 vouchers for low-income families, half of whom have found apart-
ments in the suburbs. Gautreaux fosters racial and economic integration
and deconcentrates poverty. Participants who find suburban apartments
are more likely to find jobs; their children are more likely to do well in
school.114 A universal rental allowance program would be the most ef-
fective strategy for dramatically reducing homelessness; in addition,
some provision for community support services for homeless people with
additional problems (i.e., substance abuse) would be needed.
Public safety. Community involvement in anti-crime efforts is the
most effective strategy for promoting public safety and reducing disorder.
This, in turn, helps attract people and jobs to inner cities. Reducing the
fear of crime, and the perception of public disorder and chaos, is as im-
portant as reducing the crime rate itself. Community-oriented policing-
113. For a discussion of efforts to improve subsidized housing developments, see LANGLEY
KEYES, STRATEGIES AND SAINTS (1992); John Atlas & Peter Dreier, From "Projects" to Com-
munities: How to Redeem Public Housing, AM. PROSPECT, Summer 1992, at 74, 74-85.
114. James E. Rosenbaum & Susan J. Popkin, Employment and Earnings of Low-Income
Blacks Who Move to Middle-Class Suburbs, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 342-55 (Christopher
Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991).
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getting beat cops out of cars, onto neighborhood streets, and engaged in
problem-solving-has demonstrated success in several cities. Resident-
sponsored "crime watch" efforts also help build trust between residents
and law enforcement officials as well as build solidarity among neighbors.
These efforts involve a range of activities-boarding up buildings, im-
proving lighting, organizing "take back the streets" programs, setting up
rape crisis hot lines, and creating computerized arson-prevention
programs.
Violence fueled by drug abuse and trafficking comprises a major ele-
ment of the urban crime problem. Interdiction policies have failed. Edu-
cation and treatment programs are more effective, but drug treatment on
demand must be a critical component of an urban anti-crime strategy.
Such programs save $11.50 for every dollar spent, much of it in reduced
incarceration costs."1 ' Programs to help at-risk youth are another key
component of an urban anti-crime policy.
Community organizing. CDC-sponsored economic and housing de-
velopment, resident-management of subsidized housing, and neighbor-
hood crime watches are all part of community self-help and
empowerment strategies. Their success depends, at least in part, on
strong resident involvement in neighborhood improvement efforts. Com-
munity organizing efforts have had their ups and downs, but even during
the fallow 1980s, which saw dramatic cutbacks in the federal VISTA
program, community organizations played an important role in success-
ful, though small-scale, inner-city improvement." 6 National networks
such as ACORN, the Industrial Areas Foundation, Citizen Action, and
National Peoples Action, as well as more local initiatives, fostered citizen
activism on a wide range of neighborhood-level and national issues.
Much of the recent anti-redlining successes, for example, are a direct
result of community organizing. A number of foundations and church
groups helped fund these efforts. While historically skeptical of main-
stream politics, these groups became increasingly engaged in electoral
politics, helping to elect their own, and other, activists. Some of the na-
tion's most progressive mayors, state legislators, and urban Congress
members were catapulted to office by these organizing efforts.
115. CONFRONTING THE NATION'S URBAN CRISIS, supra note 99, at 18.
116. See HARRY C. BOYTE, COMMONWEALTH: A RETURN TO CITIZEN POLITICS (1989);
HARRY C. BOYTE ET AL., CITIZEN ACTION AND THE NEW POPULISM (1986). Articles in a
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VI. CONCLUSION
Clearly, any effort to address the nation's urban crisis must result
from serious rethinking about how these problems are framed and should
build coalitions of mutual self-interest between cities and suburbs.
The major obstacle to carrying out some version of this urban policy
agenda is not economic, but political. The political influence of powerful
business interests, and the Pentagon and military contractors, have dis-
torted national priorities. Add to this equation the changing metropoli-
tan demographics, congressional gerrymandering, and the impact of
racism, and the prospects for building a national agenda that helps re-
build cities appear difficult. Overcoming these obstacles requires political
reforms that will level the playing field and give relatively powerless
groups a strong voice in setting national priorities. The two most impor-
tant reforms needed are changing the nation's voter registration laws and
modifying its campaign finance rules.
Unless urban residents vote, their concerns will be ignored. The
United States has the lowest level of voter turnout of any major democ-
racy. Typically, only about half of the eligible electorate vote in a presi-
dential election year and even less in off years. Registration is the major
barrier; more than two-thirds of those who are registered actually vote.
Poor and minority voters, particularly those in large cities, are the least
likely groups to register to vote. Once at the polls, urban voters-partic-
ularly the poor and minorities-tend to vote overwhelmingly for Demo-
crats in national elections. The 55% turnout in the 1992 presidential
election was the largest in almost thirty years. In the three-way 1992
presidential race, the Clinton-Gore ticket received 53% of the vote in
central cities; the margin was higher in the larger cities.
In Canada, when an election is called, a complete national registra-
tion is carried out in a matter of weeks by a federal agency called Elec-
tions Canada. In national elections over 70% of eligible voters normally
go to the polls. In the United States, by contrast, the onus is entirely on
the individual to register. A major reason for the low rate of urban vot-
ing is the nation's complex, crazy-quilt voter registration laws. Rules
differ from state to state and, often, from community to community.
This obstacle could be partly cured with passage of the National Voter
Registration Act-the so-called "motor voter" bill sponsored by Senator
Wendell Ford, passed by Congress, and vetoed by President Bush in
July, 1992. It would significantly increase voter participation by stream-
lining and improving voter registration efforts, particularly by permitting
registration at motor vehicle registries, welfare and unemployment of-
fices, and other sites. With or without this legislation, community
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groups, unions, churches, and others have to do a better job at mobilizing
the poor to vote.' 17
Even with a more activated electorate, however, the principle of
ccone person, one vote" is distorted by the power of big money in Ameri-
can politics. It distorts priorities on tax policy, defense spending, bank
reform, and other issues, depriving cities and the poor of government
assistance. Perhaps the most egregious example is the banking industry's
influence over Congress, leading to industry deregulation during the
early 1980s, the S&L crisis, and the massive taxpayer bail-out, still
underway.
The average race for United States Senate now costs well over $1
million; House races cost well over $300,000; and presidential campaigns
cost over $100 million. Most of these funds are spent on paid media,
especially television advertising. Candidates for office and incumbents in
office spend so much time raising funds, primarily from wealthy individ-
uals and businesses, that they cannot spend enough time paying attention
to other constituents. Big money shapes the kind of legislation Congress
passes or does not pass. It even determines who can afford to run for
office. At the local level, big money-particularly from real estate, bank-
ing, and related business sectors-plays a major role in local politics,
where land use issues are often paramount.
Reform of the nation's campaign finance laws should incorporate
the following elements: public financing of elections; free broadcast time
to political candidates; strict ceilings on the amounts that candidates for
office can raise in an election season; strict ceilings on the amount indi-
viduals can donate to candidates; prohibition of campaign contributions
from political action committees; and strict limits on "soft money" dona-
tions, which serve to end-run campaign finance limits.
The end of the Cold War offers an unprecedented opportunity for
America to reorder its priorities and devote its talent and resources to
domestic matters, including the rebuilding of our cities. Whether the
nation seizes the opportunity, or wastes it, is a question of political will.
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